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ABSTRACT 
 
Robert A. Policelli 
 
After the Fall:  
Vettori, Machiavelli, and the Refiguring of Italia in Sixteenth-Century Political Discourse 
(Under the Direction of Melissa M. Bullard) 
 
This thesis tracks changes in political thought in the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli and 
Francesco Vettori between 1512 and the 1520s. While modern historians have traditionally 
emphasized the early phase of their correspondence, I examine two often overlooked sources 
from later years: the letters they exchanged in the 1520s and Vettori’s history, the Sommario 
della Istoria d’Italia. By the 1520s, the Italian political terrain had experienced sweeping and 
devastating transformations. I seek to explore the effects of those changes on these Florentines’ 
thinking by highlighting an idea common to both of their writings—Italia. Through contrast with 
Vettori’s thought, I contextualize the nature of Machiavelli’s political observations after he had 
spent a decade and a half in political exile, while also shedding light on the dynamism of Italia in 
early sixteenth-century political discourse and historiography. In a short epilogue I suggest some 
ways in which a rethinking of early modern perceptions of Italia can also contribute to modern 
theoretical debates about the meaning of “nation.” 
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Introduction 
 
The correspondence between Niccolò Machiavelli and the Florentine ambassador 
Francesco Vettori, especially during the year 1513, is well known among scholars of the 
Italian Renaissance.1 In those letters, one finds Machiavelli, post res perditas, eloquently 
lamenting his rural life in the wake of political exile by the Medici regime;2 the 
announcement of his undertaking a “little work” on the subject of principalities;3 and, as 
some modern historians, most recently and comprehensively John Najemy, have pointed out, 
 
1 For a review of the correspondence see the introduction in Giorgio Inglese, ed., Niccolò Machiavelli: Lettere a 
Francesco Vettori e a Francesco Guicciardini, hereafter cited as Lettere (Milan: Biblioteca universale Rizzoli, 
1989), 5-91. The most comprehensive work on the epistolary exchanges is John Najemy, Between Friends: 
Discourses of Power and Desire in the Machiavelli—Vettori Letters of 1513-1515 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). On the status of the correspondence in modern historiography see Najemy, 3-17.  
 
2 Especially well known in that regard is the letter of 10 December 1513 in which Machiavelli described his 
daily routine in Sant’Andrea in Percussina where, he related, with the coming of evening, “I enter into the 
ancient courts of ancient men, where, having been received affectionately, I feast on that food which alone is 
mine, and for which I was born, where I am not ashamed to speak with them and ask them the reasons for their 
actions, and where they, in all their humanity, answer me, and for four hours I feel no boredom, I forget all 
problems of the world, I do not fear poverty; death does not scare me: I give myself totally over to them” 
[Venuta la sera, mi ritorno in casa et entro nel mio scrittoio…entro nelle antique corti degli antique huomini, 
dove, da loro ricevuto amorevolmente, mi pasco di quell cibo, che solum et mio, et che io nacqui per lui; dove 
io non mi vergogno parlare con loro, et domandarli della ragione delle loro actioni; et quelli per loro humanità 
mi rispondono; et non sento per quattro hore di tempo alcuna noia, sdimenticho ogni affanno, non temo la 
povertà, non mi sbigottiscie la morte: tucto mi transferisco in loro], Lettere, 195.  
 
3 In the same letter of 10 December: “I have composed a small work De principatibus, where I explore the 
limits of the subject as much as possible, discussing what a principality is, their variations, how they are 
acquired, how they are maintained, and why they are lost” [et composto uno opuscolo De principatibus, dove io 
mi profondo quanto io posso nelle cogitationi di questo subbietto, disputando che cosa è principato, di quale 
spetie sono, come e’ si acquistono, e’ si mantengono, perché e’ si perdono], Lettere, 195.  
 
2a prefiguring of the thematic and discursive contours of The Prince, which Machiavelli 
composed later that same year.4
The two Florentines continued their conversations into the next decade, until the year 
of Machiavelli’s death, 1527, but this later period in their ongoing dialogue has received 
considerably less attention from modern scholars. In the intervening decade and a half, the 
political terrain of the Italian peninsula underwent swift and substantial change. The foreign 
invasions that had begun in 1494 when King Charles VIII of France crossed the Alps had 
developed by the 1520s into a showdown between French monarch Francis I and Holy 
Roman Emperor and Hapsburg King Charles V, who fought out their continuing struggle for 
continental hegemony on Italian soil. The presence of foreign armies during those years led 
to military disasters and the loss of political self-determination for many Italian states, whose 
own rivalries and small mercenary forces proved an inadequate defense against the advances 
of the more powerful monarchs and their larger armies. The question remains, did the 
political upheaval in the subsequent decade significantly alter the intellectual dynamic 
between the two interlocutors? Did the interplay of ideas between them take a turn in the 
overlooked final chapter of their dialogue? The answer, to the extent that one is possible, 
may shed some light on several issues, including the extent to which Machiavelli, having by 
that time been in exile for over ten years, was able to remain “in touch” with the changing 
political situation in Italy.  
 
4 See especially Najemy, 176-214. Other insightful works exploring the intertextual continuities between the 
1513 letters and The Prince include Frederico Chabod, “Sulla Composizione de Il Principe di Niccolò 
Machiavelli,” in Scritti su Machiavelli (Turin: G. Einaudi, 1964), 195-241; Gennaro Sasso, Niccolò 
Machiavelli: Storia del suo pensiero politico (Bologna: il Mulino, 1980), 293-335; Ugo Dotti, Niccolò 
Machiavelli: la fenomenologia del potere (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1979), 17-52, 100-106; and Dotti, Machiavelli 
rivoluzionario (Rome: Carocci, 2003), 243-280. 
 
3This essay turns to an idea common to Machiavelli’s and Vettori’s writings from 
1513 through the 1520s, Italia, which can serve as a touchstone—a kind of litmus test for 
evaluating the nature of changes in their political thought. Despite the fierce political 
divisions within the land South of the Alps, the two friends wrote with a decidedly peninsular 
focus; the security and future of Italia, rather than the authors’ native Florence predominated 
their ongoing epistolary dialogue.5 Between 1513 and 1528 the peninsula’s political terrain 
transformed and so, too, did each man’s perceptions and articulations of Italia; the meanings 
of Italia that Vettori and Machiavelli conceptualized in 1513, which are discussed below, 
became, over the next fifteen years, more nuanced and, in some subtle ways, developed along 
increasingly different lines. This essay traces that development and divergence into the 1520s 
by examining two largely overlooked texts: the Machiavelli-Vettori correspondence after 
1513 and Vettori’s own formal history of the period, the Sommario della Istoria d’Italia.6
5 In his discussion of the 1513 correspondence, Italian scholar Ugo Dotti noted that it, “it is here that a break 
opens up: a break, that is, with the usual mode of posing problems from an exclusively Florentine point of view 
and instead adopting, on the contrary, a decisively Italian perspective…not only the drama of Florence’s health, 
but that of the entire peninsula.” [è qui che si opera [una] forma di rottura: la rottura cioè col consueto modo di 
porre i problemi dall’esclusivo punto di vista fiorentino per assumerne uno, al contrario, decisamente italiano…
non soltanto il dramma della salute di Firenze ma quello dell’intera penisola], Dotti, rivoluzionario, 248.  
 
6 The definitive and only complete edited collection of Vettori’s works is Francesco Vettori, Scritti storici e 
politici, ed. Enrico Niccolini, hereafter cited as Scritti (Bari: G. Laterza, 1972). That compilation includes 
extensive archival, bibliographic, and paleographic summaries, see 397-411 for detailed manuscript information 
regarding the Sommario. The Sommario is not the focus of any major studies, but does receive insightful 
commentary and analysis in the following works: Benedetto Croce, “Pagine di Francesco Vettori,” La Critica 
39 (1941): 237-242; Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century 
Florence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 243-244, 248-254, 268-269, 292; Rudolf von Albertini, 
Firenze dalla Repubblica al Principato (Turin: Einaudi, 1995), 248-261; Mario Santoro, Fortuna, ragione e 
prudenzia nella civilità letteraria del cinquecento (Naples: Liguori, 1978), 393-405; Gian Luigi Betti, “La 
Ragione Negata: Il Sommario della Istoria d’Italia di Francesco Vettori,” Studi Senesi XCIV (1983): 401-409; 
Andrea Matucci, Machiavelli nella storiografia fiorentina (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1991), 236-240; Franco 
Gaeta, “Il Percorso Storiografico di Francesco Guicciardini,” in Francesco Guicciardini: 1483-1983, nel V 
centenario della nascita (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1983), 156; and Dotti, fenomenologia, 22-32.  
 
4Composed in 1528,7 the Sommario details the Italian Wars between 1512 and 1527. It 
is an important, if largely forgotten work that illustrates the astuteness of Vettori’s historical 
thought. In many ways, Vettori still lingers in the shadows of modern Renaissance 
historiography.8 Despite recent studies such as those by Najemy and Dotti that underscore 
Vettori’s provocative role as Machiavelli’s intellectual foil in the years preceding The Prince,
the majority of modern scholarship presents Vettori largely as an ancillary, passive receptacle 
next to his more famous friend, not as a thinker in his own right.9 In particular, the overall 
profusion of Machiavelli studies has overshadowed Vettori’s accomplishments as a 
historian.10 Vettori’s historical work plays an important role in our understanding of the 
exchange of ideas between him and Machiavelli. In Between Friends, John Najemy focused 
on the friendly dispute between Vettori and Machiavelli during the years 1513-1515 
regarding the limits of political discourse, an issue that Najemy saw present and still 
unresolved within the pages of The Prince.11 In fact, both writers implicitly engaged the 
viewpoints of the other through their formal writings. Just as The Prince reflected prior 
 
7 See Rosemary Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori: Florentine Citizen and Medici Servant (London: Athlone 
Press, 1972), 51; Albertini, 250; and Betti, 401. 
 
8 On Vettori’s political career see Devonshire Jones’s detailed biography. See also a brief character sketch in 
Albertini, 246-265, and a short but useful “biobibliography” in Niccolini, Scritti, 359-367. 
 
9 Najemy’s work is the notable exception to the rule.  
 
10 Vettori’s corpus includes, in addition to the Sommario, an anecdotal account of his travels in Germany, 
Viaggio in Alamagna, a dialogue on the Sack of Rome, biographies of his father Piero and of Lorenzo de’ 
Medici, the Duke of Urbino, as well as many diplomatic and personal letters. 
 
11 Najemy, 102-103, 107-109, 124-127, 144-146, 176-177, 185-191, 202, 208-209, 347. In that amicable 
disagreement, a skeptical Vettori argued against a rationally optimistic Machiavelli; the former asserted the 
inability of language to describe problems and to offer solutions for what he viewed as ever-changing and 
infinitely complex political realities, while the latter maintained the existence of absolute, universal political 
truths that language could both discern and describe. For Najemy, that dialogue about “the intelligibility of the 
world and the possibility of coherent and effective political discourse” carried out in private correspondence 
was continued within the pages of Machiavelli’s most influential work—in Najemy’s words, there is a “polemic 
against Vettori that pervades The Prince,” Najemy, 201-202. 
 
5discussions between Machiavelli and Vettori, so, too, does the Sommario. Machiavelli died 
just before Vettori began writing, but in his history Vettori employed many of the same terms 
and engaged some of the same issues, like political discourse, that had appeared in his prior 
correspondence with Machiavelli and in The Prince itself.12 One of those contested issues 
was Italia. Given its peninsular scope, the Sommario provides significant insight into 
Vettori’s perception of Italia and the ways in which it contrasted with Machiavelli’s in the 
1520s. In giving voice to Vettori’s later observations, I want to leave open the possibility that 
between these two Florentines, Vettori had the more “realistic” or “modern” perspective 
measured against the altered political situation in Italy by the 1520s. 
While following the diachronic development of Vettori’s and Machiavelli’s ideas 
through the theme of Italia, this paper also explores, on a parallel track, the broader question 
of the valence of Italia in early modern political discourse. Among modern historians of the 
early modern period, Italia is a contested term. Some dismiss Italia as empty of meaning 
during the Renaissance on the grounds that most Italians during that time identified 
themselves primarily through regional loyalties. Edward Muir recently commented that 
preunification Italy was “a dream that has been given far more credit as an idea than it 
deserves, an idea far more ephemeral than the persistence of local and regional identities.”13 
Yet that “idea” that Muir so quickly disparaged proliferated in the writings of many Italian 
 
12 For instance, briefly indicating his skeptical position regarding the capacity of political discourse to reach 
certain truth-claims, Vettori cautioned in the introduction to the Sommario that “my purpose here is not to write 
an entire history, nor am I so arrogant as to convince myself of having perfectly resolved the matters I discuss,” 
Scritti, 137. 
 
13 As quoted by Gene Brucker, “The Horseshoe Nail: Structure and Contingency in Medieval and Renaissance 
Florence,” in Living on the Edge in Leonardo’s Florence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 64. 
Lauro Martines has similarly dismissed Italia as having hardly any real significance during the Renaissance, see 
Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination: City States in Renaissance Italy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1988), 111-113.  
 
6intellectuals.14 Though campanilismo—literally, loyalty to one’s bell tower—likely held far 
more sway over most of the people living on the peninsula, that does not necessarily negate 
the simultaneous presence of Italia in political and historical writings. Other modern 
historians describe Italia during the premodern period as either a “geographical expression,” 
indicating the peninsula south of the Alps, or as a “cultural construct,” a recognition of 
cultural difference among the people who lived on that peninsula from others who lived 
outside of it.15 Such descriptions of Italia’s historical meaning are accurate but incomplete. 
Early modern Italians had in common a set of cultural traditions built upon the heritage of 
classical Rome; they had a conglomeration of states bound together in a political system of 
ever-fluctuating diplomatic relations; and they had an awareness of cultural and linguistic 
 
14 There are, of course, some modern historians who detect and explore issues of early modern italianità, that is, 
Italianness, or the idea of Italia which they naturally assume to be valid categories of analysis. Key examples 
include Vincent Ilardi’s “Italianità Among Some Italian Intellectuals in the Early Sixteenth Century,” Tradito 
12 (1956): 339-367, which includes commentary on the role of Italia in both political and poetic writings of the 
sixteenth century. Felix Gilbert, “The Concept of Nationalism in Machiavelli’s Prince,” Studies in the 
Renaissance 1 (1954): 38-48, briefly situates Machiavelli’s “Exhortation” in terms of other, earlier writers’ 
approaches to the idea of a unified Italy. The most recent work on premodern “national” Italian sentiment is 
William J. Kennedy, The Site of Petrarchism: Early Modern National Sentiment in Italy, France, and England 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), see especially 8-15 and 20-73. Not only does Kennedy 
connect Petrarch’s works to the growing diffusion of italianità in the early modern period, but he offers 
insightful critical review and argument regarding the validity of studying “national” issues in the premodern era. 
See also Pauline Moffitt Watts, “The Donation of Constantine, Cartography, and Papal Plenitdo Potestatis in 
the Sixteenth Century: A Paper for Salvatore Camporeale,” Modern Language Notes 119 Supplement (2004): 
S88-S99, and Francesca Fiorani, The Marvel of Maps: Art, Cartography and Politics in Renaissance Italy (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 171-232, who examine the Galleria delle Carte Geografiche in the 
Vatican Palace, executed between 1578 and 1581 by Egnazio Danti. That famous map room depicts the regions 
of Italy and, argue Moffitt Watts and Fiorani, connects them in a common, Italian historical narrative through 
accompanying historical vignettes depicting moments of seemingly united Italian defense against Northern 
military incursions from the fourth century BC down to the sixteenth century. Though that artistic project came 
well after Vettori’s and Machiavelli’s deaths, it stands as the most vivid early modern example of Italia as an 
idea transcending both contemporary political boundaries and the intervening centuries between the sixteenth 
century and antiquity.  
 
15 Austrian minister Clemens von Metternich (1773-1859) labeled Italy a “geographical expression” in a 1849 
letter; historians of Italy subsequently appropriated the term and continue to apply it to preunification Italy. See 
for example Denis Mack Smith, Modern Italy: A Political History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1997), 3-6; Steven A. Epstein’s review of Italy Revisited: The Encyclopedia in Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 35 (2005): 558; and Christopher Duggan, A Concise History of Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), xiii.  
 
7differences from peoples beyond the Alps—the oltramontani. The economic dominance of 
Italian banking and commerce and the cultural productivity of the region, especially in the 
fine arts and in humanistic writings, created, particularly among the Italian humanists 
themselves, a sense of Italian cultural superiority over the rest of the European continent.16 
The urban experience also served as common ground among individuals from the various 
states.17 In these ways, Italia certainly contained geographical and cultural significances, but 
it also contained much more.   
By labeling early modern Italia as merely a geographical and cultural indicator, 
historians paint a static picture that does not accord with some of the writings of that 
period—then, as now, the word Italia was a contested category. As described below, the idea 
of Italia had its origins in antiquity when Roman rule consolidated the tribes of the peninsula. 
The ancients depicted Italia as inextricably tied to the preeminence and martial dominance of 
Rome; they represented Italia as unified, strong, and superior to its transalpine neighbors. In 
broad terms, that depiction of Italia persisted after the collapse of Rome and through the 
centuries of political fragmentation. But during the so-called “crisis of Italy,”18 the protracted 
period of war and political instability lasting from 1494 to the 1530s that drastically 
reordered the peninsula’s political balance of power and subjected virtually the whole of it to 
foreign influence, the inherited understanding of Italia fell into question. Francesco Vettori 
 
16 Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 255, and Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political 
Thought, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 85.  
 
17 “A native of Florence or Milan or Naples could travel to any other Italian city and feel immediately at home 
in that urban milieu: its buildings, its streets, its churches, its social and political structures, its economic 
activity, and its culture,” Brucker, 65. 
 
18 Guicciardini referred to the period as the calamità d’Italia; Machiavelli, la ruina d’Italia; and Vettori, la 
morte of Italy. Important modern histories on the crisis of the 1520s include J.N. Stephens’s The Fall of the 
Florentine Republic: 1512-1530 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), Albertini and Devonshire Jones.  
 
8challenged the traditional mode of representing Italia by introducing the idea of a fallen and 
irreversibly weakened Italia in his writings of the mid 1520s.  
The plan for this paper is, first, to locate the classical and medieval origins of Italia;
second, to explore how Machiavelli and Vettori each wrote of Italia in 1513, that is, how 
each appropriated that inherited classical tradition of writing Italia; and third, to examine 
how Vettori’s and Machiavelli’s approaches to the idea of Italia diverged in the 1520s. In the 
final section, I suggest some ways in which understanding Italia as a dynamic and contested, 
rather than static, term during the Renaissance may help inform some of the semantic issues 
regarding Italian national identity that have persisted since the sixteenth century. 
 
Roman Italia: Origins and Echoes 
 
By writing of Italia as a unified political and historical entity rather than a patchwork 
of independent polities, Renaissance intellectuals like Vettori and Machiavelli recalled 
earlier, classical representations of the word.19 Their discourses on Italia exemplified, in the 
words of Ugo Dotti, “the national rebirth of the peninsula” (emphasis added).20 Those 
sixteenth-century Florentines were looking back, past the intervening centuries of political 
fragmentation, to the Italia of antiquity, when the peninsula was politically unified under the 
aegis of Roman influence. The word Italia, perhaps a derivative of the Greek vitalia, or
“cattle country,”21 originally referred to a small swath of land in Southern Calabria and the 
tribe occupying it around the fifth century BC. After the success of the Punic Wars, Roman 
hegemony spread across the peninsula and after the “Social War” of the late first century BC, 
Roman citizenship was granted to the tribes of Italy (83 BC).22 By the time of Augustus’ rule, 
19 What follows here is an incomprehensive summary of the rhetorical tradition of Italia preceding Machiavelli 
and Vettori and emphasizing writers whose works those sixteenth century Florentines were most likely familiar. 
For more wider ranging, broad overviews of the idea of Italia in history from antiquity down to the nineteenth 
century see Ernesto Sestan, “L’idea di una unità della storia italiana,” Rivista Storica Italiana 62 (1950): 180-
198; John Larner, Italy in the Age of Dante and Petrarch (London: Longman, 1980), 1-16; Nicholas Doumanis, 
Italy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1-45; and Duggan, 1-8. 
 
20 “La rinascita nazionale della penisola,” Dotti, fenonenologia, 38.  
 
21 Ernest Pulgram, The Tongues of Italy: Prehistory and History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1958), 19-20. Also, for background on the pre-Roman origins of the word Italia see the entry “Italia” in Brill’s 
New Pauly Antiquity, vol. 4 (2005), ed. Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider, 993. 
 
22 For the conquest and Romanization of the peninsula and its subsequent elevation to special colonial status see 
Arthur Keaveney, Rome and the Unification of Italy (Exeter: Bristol Phoenix Press, 2005), especially 99-115 
and 189-195; Jean-Michel David, The Roman Conquest of Italy, trans. Antonia Nevill (Oxford: Oxford 
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Italia had reached a close approximation of its modern geographical significance, spanning 
roughly from the Alps in the north to Sicily in the south.23 Around that time, in the first 
century BC, Roman writers such as Pliny the Elder, Cicero, and Livy, whose works were 
familiar to Vettori and Machiavelli, wrote of Italia as a unified political entity with a shared 
history.24 
In his Commentariolum petitionis (c. 64 BC), a treatise on electioneering tactics, 
Cicero advised the would-be consul to envision Italia as an undivided political unit, urging 
him to “comprehend in your mind and memory the whole of Italy [totam Italiam].”25 The 
historian Titus Livy, perhaps Machiavelli’s greatest classical influence, collapsed Italy and 
Rome into a singular geographical and political unit.26 For example, in his prefatory speech 
before his famous invasion of the Italian peninsula, the Carthaginian general Hannibal, 
through the creative filter of Livy’s pen, referred to the Alps as the “walls of Rome,”27 while 
 
University Press, 1997), 1-8, 157-182 and Michael Crawford, “Early Rome and Italy,” in The Oxford Illustrated 
History of the Roman World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 9-39.  
 
23 Pliny the Elder and Cato both considered the geographical contours of Italia as stretching from the Alps, 
down the length of the peninsula, and on to Sicily. See Pliny the Elder, Natural History, trans. John Healy (New 
York: Penguin, 1991), III.38-138, 43-48. For Cato’s comments summarized, see New Pauly, 993. 
 
24 Vettori and Machiavelli likely began their classical education at young ages, possibly under the tutelage of 
the same teacher, the priest Paolo Sasso da Ronciglione. See Devonshire Jones, 7, and, on Machiavelli’s early 
classical literary encounters, Sebastian De Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989), 5-6. On 23 November 1513 from his ambassadorial post in Rome, Vettori wrote Machiavelli that in his 
free time he was reading Livy, Sallust, Tacitus, Ammianus Marcellinus, Suetonius, and Aelius Lampridius, 
among others, (Lettere, 189). Both the informal and formal writings of both men indicate a deep appreciation 
and knowledge of many classical Roman and some Greek authors. 
 
25 Cicero, Letters to Quintus and Brutus, Letter Fragments, Letter to Octavian, Invectives, Handbook of 
Electioneering, ed. and trans. D.R. Shackleton Bailey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), page 
424, line 33. 
 
26 Livy himself was not a Roman of the Romans, but a native Paduan (born in 59 BC), thus his persistent 
patriotism throughout his histories, especially in recounting the war with Hannibal, is further testament to the 
fluidity of Roman and Italian identities by the late first century BC. 
 
27 Titus Livy, The War with Hannibal, trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt and ed. Betty Radice (New York: Penguin, 
1972), 60. 
 
11
his Roman counterpart Scipio called his troops to the “defense of Italy,” that is, “our 
homeland.”28 Livy’s rhetorical choices indicate a precedent in antiquity for invoking, in a 
poetic and sentimental vein, the idea of Italia as an extension of Rome, especially in the 
context of imminent military threats. By the time of Augustus’s rule, Virgil, a poet whom 
Vettori and Machiavelli frequently cited,29 consciously joined together Italia and Rome in a 
shared, divinely ordained, and seemingly predestined historical path. In the final book of the 
Aeneid (c. 19 BC), set in the mythic fog of Rome’s nascent days, Virgil foreshadowed the 
future greatness of the city as dependent on the union of Rome and its Italian neighbors, as 
the goddess Juno decreed to Aeneas “let Italian valor be the strength of Rome in after 
times.”30 The idea of “Italian valor,” or in Machiavelli’s parlance, Italian virtù, was critical to 
Machiavelli’s expressions of Italia centuries later, as I will show. 
When Rome fell, so, too, did the reality of a politically unified and militarily 
powerful Italia. Yet despite the emergence of fierce and long-standing political 
fragmentation, poets and political observers kept alive classical representations of a strong, 
united Italia. The most notable medieval contributors to that rhetorical tradition were Dante 
and Petrarch.31 Dante understood peninsular internecine warfare and the corrupt, abusive 
 
28 Ibid., 67. 
 
29 For example, Machiavelli references the Aeneid in Principe, XVII, Opere di Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. 1, ed. 
Rinaldo Rinaldi, hereafter cited as Opere (Turin: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1999), 284. Vettori 
echoes the same epic poem in his 23 November 1513 letter to Machiavelli as well as that of 16 January 1515, 
Lettere, 280-282. Also see Najemy, 309-310, 317-318. 
 
30 “And let Italian valor be the strength of Rome in after times,” Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. Robert Fitzgerald 
(New York: Vintage, 1990), XII. 1121-1123, 398.  
 
31 It is worth noting the special place that Dante and Petrarch held in Machiavelli’s and likely Vettori’s lists of 
favorite authors. Writing to Vettori in the now famous letter of 10 December 1513, Machiavelli mentioned that 
he usually spent a portion of his mornings reading either Dante or Petrarch. “Partitomi del bosco, io me ne vo a 
una fonte, et di quivi in un mio uccellare. Ho un libro sotto, o Dante o Petrarca,” Lettere, 194. Machiavelli also 
began his letter to Vettori of 9 April 1513 with a Dantean passage from Inferno, Lettere, 110. Also see Najemy, 
103-107. 
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presence of the Roman church as having wracked Italy, leading him in Purgatorio to lament, 
“Ah, Italy enslaved, abode of misery, pilotless ship in a fierce tempest tossed, no mistress 
over provinces but a harlot!. . .untamed and wild. . .widowed and bereft.”32 In his De 
monarchia (c. 1315), the poet expressed a desire for the Holy Roman Emperor Henry VII to 
descend into Italy and to unite the disparate Italian states and put an effective end to the 
violence that had plagued the peninsula for centuries.33 Dante echoed that hope again in the 
Purgatorio, when Italia personified cried out, “My Caesar, why are you not with me?”34 
Dante grieved for Italia and the absence within it of unity and strength, yet, through his 
appeals to Henry VII, Dante also held out hope that Italia could be redeemed from its 
“bereft” state. For Dante, the Italia of antiquity—internally peaceful and strong—was not 
dead and gone, but rather lying in wait for its savior. The “pilotless ship” persisted, requiring 
only a commander.  
A generation after Dante in the fourteenth century, Petrarch drew inspiration from the 
idea of a strong Italia, Rome’s Italia.35 Like Dante before him and Machiavelli after him, 
Petrarch reflected on the presence of Northern armies on the peninsula. While 
acknowledging and despairing over Italy’s seeming weakness relative to its “barbarian” 
invaders, Petrarch held close the idea of the potentially powerful Italia. As with Dante, 
Petrarch’s image of classical Italia waited for its rebirth. In his sonnet “Italia mia,” Petrarch 
 
32 Dante, Purgatorio, trans. Jean and Robert Hollander (New York: Doubleday, 2003), VI. 76-78, 98, and 113. 
 
33 Scholars have debated the plausibility of such hopes, see introduction by Prue Shaw in Dante, Monarchy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ix-xxxv. Jean and Robert Hollander identify three “stages” of 
Dante’s appeals to Henry VII: “initial dubiety” from 1308-1310; excitement 1310-1311; and, finally “wary 
enthusiasm” by the spring of 1311, see notes in Dante, Purgatorio, 126.  
 
34 Ibid., VI. 114.  
 
35 Kennedy, 8-15 and 23-36. 
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pinned blame for the foreign invasions squarely on Italian shoulders. The poet faulted 
contemporary Italians for not living up to their ancestral stock as the heirs of Roman military 
prowess. Petrarch specifically berated his fellow Italians for the reality of continued defeat in 
battle; the onus to strongly defend Italia is with the Italians, for they are the ones, in 
Petrarch’s words, with that “gentle Latin blood.”36 Petrarch implied a direct, almost 
biological link with the ancient Romans that infused in the Italians of his day the capacity to 
“throw down this burden, rise up from this shame.”37 The failure of Italian arms was, for him, 
the failure to recover the spirit of antiquity: “to let the Northerly fury, a savage race, Conquer 
our intellect, Is our own sin.”38 Perhaps most important for later discussions of Italia in the 
early sixteenth century, Petrarch couched his descriptions of Italian strength in terms of 
virtù—a word and idea central to Machiavelli’s political thought and his perceptions of 
Italia, described below. Virtù was a term derived from the Latin virtus, or manliness, and in 
the early sixteenth century referred to strong, aggressive action often in a military context.39 
Years later, in the final, emotional lines of The Prince, Machiavelli turned to Petrarch’s 
words, also from “Italia mia,” to invoke the idea of a persistent Italian virtù inherited from 
Rome and still present in his own day: “Virtù against the fury will take up the arms and put 
combat to flight for the ancient valor in the hearts of the Italians is not yet dead.”40 
36 Petrarch, Sonnets and Songs, trans. Anna Maria Armi (New York: Pantheon, 1968), CXXVIII, 207. 
 
37 Ibid., 207. 
 
38 Ibid., 207. 
 
39 Skinner, 87, describes the Latin etymology and connection to ideas of masculinity.  
 
40 “Virtù contro a furore prenderà l’armi, e fia el combater corto, ché l’antico valore nelli italici cor non è ancor 
morto,” Machiavelli, Principe, XXVI, Opere, 400. Vettori’s knowledge of Petrarch is confirmed in his letter to 
Machiavelli from 9 February 1514 (Lettere, 223).  
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 Just over fifty years before Machiavelli and Vettori began their writings, a humanist 
of the papal court, Flavio Biondo, penned Italia illustrata (1448-1453), which provided not 
only a geographical, topological, and cultural summation of the peninsula’s regions, but also 
a celebration of a common Italian history. In his prefatory remarks, Biondo announced his 
intention to preserve “the places and peoples of Italian antiquity…to revive and record the 
names that have been obliterated, and in a word to bring some light to bear upon the 
murkiness of Italian history.”41 The continuity of Roman civilization in his contemporary 
Italy (most manifestly in the institution of the Roman church) was a dominant theme in that 
work as well as Biondo’s others, Roma instaurata (1466) and Roma triumphans (1457-1459). 
Half a century after Biondo and one year after the French invasion of 1494, Bernardo 
Rucellai’s military history De Bello Italico (1495) appeared in Latin.42 The text recounted 
Charles VIII’s expedition across the Alps and as far South as Naples. Vettori and Machiavelli 
likely read that work, which employed Italia as its geographical framework.43 
41 Flavio Biondo, Italy Illuminated ed. and trans. Jeffrey A. White (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2005), 5. See also the useful introduction by the editor, vii-xxii. Biondo’s citations for Italia illustrata included 
Cicero, Pliny the Elder, Virgil, and Livy. See Biondo, xiv. 
 
42 See Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 203-218. 
 
43 Vettori’s mother was Bernardo’s sister and Vettori’s brother Paolo married Bernardo’s granddaughter. See 
Devonshire Jones, xi, 2, and Najemy, 74. More to the point, Vettori and Machiavelli both attended the 
intellectual symposiums at the Rucellai gardens in Florence. In the words of Felix Gilbert, “the works of the 
great historians of the following decades, of Francesco Vettori and Francesco Guicciardini, are in the line of 
succession from Rucellai’s historical efforts, at least in so far as the broad Italian framework, the use of history 
as a practical guide to politics and the emphasis on the psychology of the participating statesmen are 
concerned,” Gilbert, “Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricellari: A Study on the Origin of Modern Political 
Thought,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 12 (1949): 12; see also Albertini, 67-85.  
 
1513: Before the Fall 
Although Vettori’s and Machiavelli’s respective thinking about that idea of Italia,
inherited from those classical writers, crystallized and diverged most noticeably in the 1520s, 
in 1513 they were already thinking about political developments in a peninsular scope. In 
that year, Machiavelli had only just begun his political exile, while Vettori held a position in 
Rome as a Florentine ambassador to the Medici papal court.44 In their 1513 letters 
Machiavelli and Vettori were concerned with the security of Italia, then threatened by the 
presence of foreign armies on the peninsula and the seeming inevitability of Swiss, French, 
and Spanish hegemonic expansions. The Swiss, then in possession of Milan, a protectorate of 
Massimiliano Sforza worried them above all.45 
Considering the immediate presence of foreign armies, in 1513 Vettori appeared 
relatively optimistic regarding the prospects of productive military cooperation between the 
Italian states. Writing on 5 August 1513 Vettori suggested to Machiavelli that the military 
cooperation of “tutta Italia” might halt Swiss advancement South of the Alps and that the 
peninsula might somehow regain some semblance of its pre-1494 political system of 
independent states—if events fell in the right way, “Italy” might find “itself back in its 
 
44 Devonshire Jones, 85-108. 
 
45 Lettere, 143-184.  
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previous boundaries.”46 Writing in reply to Vettori on 10 August, Machiavelli made light of 
Vettori’s apparent optimism in the possibility of Italian collaboration: “as far as the union of 
the Italians, you make me laugh; first, because there will never be any union to good ends, 
and even if the leaders were united, it would not be enough, there are no armies here worth a 
penny.”47 
Still, in that same letter Machiavelli worried over the future of the peninsula as a 
whole, fretting about the “the ruin of Italy”48 and noting that the seemingly inexorable Swiss 
troops were “a great danger for Italy.”49 He concluded the final letter of the summer on 26 
August 1513 with a dark prediction about Italy’s future. Unless the French intervened against 
the Swiss in Italy, then, Machiavelli assumed, the Swiss would become the “arbiters of 
Italy”—to which he added, 
and because this frightens me, I would like to remedy 
the situation, but I cannot see any other remedy [altro rimedio]
and I will begin now to cry with you over our ruin and 
servitude which, if it does not come today or tomorrow, will 
come in our time; and Italy will indebt itself to Pope Julius and 
the others who do not remedy the situation, if now it may still 
be remedied.50 
46 “Né bisognerebbe temere de’ Svizzeri, i quali arebbono da l’un canto i Franzesi, dall’altro tutta Italia…Et in 
conclusione, se il Cristianissimo fosse contento a lasciare Lombardia, veggo tutta Italia in pace, et alla morte del 
re Catolico tornare il regno in un figliolo del re Federigo, e ridursi Italia ne’ primi termini,” 5 August 1513, 
Lettere, 159. 
 
47 “Quanto alla unione delli altri Italiani, voi mi fate ridere; prima perché non ci fia mai unione veruna a fare 
ben veruno; e se pure e’ fussino uniti e capi e’ non sono per bastare, sì per non ci essere armi che vagliono un 
quattrino,” 10 August 1513, Ibid., 163.  
 
48 “La rovina d’Italia,” Ibid., 163. 
 
49 “Pericolo gravissimo per la Italia,” Ibid., 164.  
 
50 “Io credo bene che possino diventare arbitri di Italia per la propinquità e per la disordini e cattive condizione 
nostre; e perché questo mi spaventa io ci vorrei rimediare, e se Francia non basta, io non ci veggo altro rimedio 
e voglio cominciare ora a piangere con voi la rovina e servitù nostra, la quale, se non sarà né oggi né domane, 
sarà a’ nostril dì; e l’Italia arà questo obbligo con papa Giulio e con quelli che non ci rimediono, se ora ci si può 
rimediare,” Lettere, 184.  
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Historians such as Najemy, Ugo Dotti, Rudolph von Albertini, and Frederico Chabod suggest 
that Machiavelli found in the conclusion of The Prince the altro rimedio that had eluded him 
in his August letter to Vettori: a redeemer prince—redentore—who could unite the Italian 
states and stem the tide of foreign invasions.51 Machiavelli prepared his reader for the 
conclusion, in which he introduced the notion of Italy’s ideal leader by bringing together the 
two concepts of Italia and virtù in the last three chapters.  
For Machiavelli, the successful repulsion of the invaders from Italy or the failure to 
do so hinged on the Italian leaders’ manifestation of their inherited virtù. Its absence 
explained Italy’s dire straights, and its potential revitalization provided Machiavelli with 
hope for Italy’s salvation. In chapter XXIV, “Why the princes of Italy have lost their states,” 
Machiavelli blamed Italian leaders for not preventing or mitigating the damage of the foreign 
invasions: 
Those princes of ours, many of whom were well-
entrenched in their principalities, may not accuse fortuna for 
their losses. Their own indolence was to blame…The only 
defenses that are good, certain and durable are those that 
depend on one’s own actions and one’s own virtù.52 
The dialectical opposition of fortuna and virtù pervaded classical and medieval political 
thought as well as that of the early sixteenth century and, in its broadest terms, represented 
the two dominant forces that vie for control of states and armies. Fortuna was the 
unpredictable and virtually uncontrollable external force which could be contained, 
neutralized, or subsumed by individual or collective military prowess, intelligence, and 
 
51 Albertini, 46-47; Dotti, fenomenologia, 37-43; Dotti, rivoluzionario, 243-253, 280-286; Najemy, 156-177; 
and Frederico Chabod, 177-188, 193. 
 
52 “Pertanto questi nostril principi, e quali erano stati molti anni nel loro principato, per averlo di poi perso non 
accusino la fortuna ma la igniavia loro…E quelle difese solamente sono buone, sono certe, sono durabili, che 
dependono da te propio e dalla virtù tua,” Machiavelli, Principe, XXV, Opere, 370-371.  
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cunning, or virtù.53 For Machiavelli, the fact that foreign armies descended upon the Italian 
peninsula and usurped many states’ political autonomy had more to do with human failings 
on the part of Italian rulers, above all their lack of foresight and decisive action, than with 
supra-peninsular events or fortuna. A collective failure of virtù accounted for the disasters at 
hand. Moreover, Machiavelli clearly suggested that those Italian princes had the potential, if 
not to prevent, then at least to render less terrible Italy’s catastrophic predicament through 
their own skills, that is, virtù.
In chapter XXV, Machiavelli invoked the image of a devastating flood to convey 
fortuna’s capacity for unpredictable destruction; the most pressing example of which was the 
waves of invasions that had overtaken Italy: 
If you consider Italy, the stage for all these changes, 
you will see that she is a countryside without dykes or 
embankments, for if Italy had been sufficiently reinforced with 
virtù, like Germany, Spain, and France, this flood would not 
have taken such a varied course, or else it would not have come 
at all.54 
The flood could have been stopped. In the emotional and, among modern scholars, 
controversial final chapter, the “Exhortation to liberate Italia from the barbarians” (hereafter 
cited as the “Exhortation”),55 Machiavelli called for the expulsion of the invaders by means 
 
53 On the opposition of fortuna and virtù see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1975), 84-88, 94-97, 108, 136, 166-169, 173, 184-185, 188-194; Skinner, 95, 121-122; 
Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 37-45. 
 
54 “E se voi considerrete la Italia, che è la sedia di queste variazioni e quella che ha dato loro il moto, vedrete 
essere una campagna sanza arigini e sanza alcuno riparo; che, s’ella fussi riparata da conveniente virtù come è 
la Magna, la Spagna e la Francia, o questa piena non arebbe fatto le variazioni grande che le ha, o ella non ci 
sare’ venuta,” Ibid., XXV, 376.  
 
55 Some of the controversy revolves around the date of the final chapter’s composition. Generally, those who 
claim a later date also argue for the passage’s peripheral importance within Machiavelli’s overall thinking. For a 
summary of this debate before 1950 see Gilbert, “Nationalism in Machiavelli’s Prince,” 38-48; for a more 
recent synopsis of the views of Gennaro Sasso and Mario Martelli, see John Najemy, 176-186. Others debate 
the seriousness of Machiavelli’s call for Italian unity as a means of expelling the ultramontane invaders. 
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of a prince with a certain set of skills and strengths. To liberate Italia, Machiavelli prescribed 
aggression, a willingness to seize the moment [occasione], and impetuousness [impetuoso], 
in other words, a prince imbued with virtù. Like Petrarch before him, Machiavelli 
distinguished “Italians” from the generic transalpine “barbarians” by noting the particularity 
of “Italian virtù.” Machiavelli’s rimedio—that called for the reactivation of that virtù through 
the efforts of a skilled leader—recalled earlier classical representations of Italia. In the 
Aeneid Virgil had written of Italian military valor as the common, uniting link between the 
Romans and their Italian neighbors. In the Purgatorio Dante had portrayed Italia as a 
rudderless vessel awaiting the arrival of its commander, similar to Machiavelli’s redeemer-
prince, who could guide it back to the greatness it had enjoyed in its classical past. Further 
reinforcing his place in a larger rhetorical tradition invoking a transcendent, classically 
rooted Italia, Machiavelli ended The Prince with the above-cited words from Petrarch’s 
canzone “Italia mia.”  
In 1515 the looming Swiss threat diminished significantly after their defeat by mostly 
French forces at the battle of Marignano, paving the way for the Hapsburg-French 
confrontation for Italian hegemony. During those years, Machiavelli continued to relate his 
conceptions of virtù and Italia; the return of virtù would also return Italia to the political 
unity and military fortitude that it had enjoyed under Roman rule.  
 
Emphasizing the theme of “love of country,” Sebastian de Grazia interpreted chapter XXVI of The Prince as the 
culminating “point of it all” of Machiavelli’s political philosophy, De Grazia, 152-158, 193. Pocock, 180-182, 
thought that the ideas of a redeemer prince and of a united Italy were too idealistic to have been a serious plan 
of political action. The irresolution of the chapter has also attracted more literary-minded interpretations that 
question the discursive and linguistic structure of the chapter: see Victoria Kahn, “Virtu and the Example of 
Agathocles in Machiavelli's Prince,” Representations 13 (1986): 78-79, and Thomas M. Greene’s “The End of 
Discourse in Machiavelli’s Prince,” Yale French Studies 67 (1984): 69-71.  
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Around 1517, in The Discourses, Machiavelli lamented Italy’s political 
fragmentation, noting the monarchical unity of France and Spain and specifically blaming the 
Roman church, which, bereft of “virtù,” had “not been able to occupy all Italy, nor had it 
allowed another to do so…and because Italy is under so many princes and signori, out of
which has been born such disunion and such weakness, Italy has become prey for powerful 
barbarian invaders and any other attacker.”56 But for the church’s lack of virtù, Italian unity 
would be possible, and that would be a positive development. Machiavelli’s general 
confidence that such a union would benefit the peninsula as a whole reinforced his insistence 
in the final pages of The Prince that the resurfacing of Italian virtù could make possible the 
military or political union of the peninsula’s states.  
Machiavelli’s hopes for Italia may seem somewhat vague because of his reliance on 
an intangible concept like virtù, and, in fact, his reflections on Italia in the Discourses 
received criticism from a prominent contemporary intellectual figure. Fellow Florentine 
historian Francesco Guicciardini highlighted the hopeful nature of Machiavelli’s vision. In 
his “Considerations on the Discorsi of Machiavelli,” Guicciardini agreed with Machiavelli 
that the Roman church was to blame for Italy’s political fragmentation, but dismissed the 
idea that the unification of states with independent political interests would be possible or, in 
the end, even desirable. The usurpation of Italian dominion by one Italian state, as 
Machiavelli had suggested in The Prince and in The Discourses, would, according to 
 
56 “Perché, avendovi quella abitato e tenuto imperio temporale, non è stata si potente né di tanta virtù che 
l’abbia potuto occupare la tyrannide d’Italia e farsene principe; e non è stata dall’altra parte si debole che, per 
paura di non perdere il dominio delle sue cose temporali la non abbia potuto convocare uno potente che la 
difenda contro a quello che in Italia fusse diventato troppo potente…Non essendo adunque stata la chiesa 
potente da potere occupare la Italia, né avendo permesso che un altro la occupy, è stata cagione che la non è 
potuta venire sotto uno capo; ma è stata sotto più principi e signori, da’ quali è nata tanta disunione e tanta 
deboleza che la si è condotta a essere stata preda non solamente de’barbari potente ma di qualunque l’assalta. Di 
che noi altri Italiani abbiamo obbligo con la chiesa e non con altri,” Machiavelli, Discorsi, I, xii in Opere, 505-
506.  
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Guicciardini, be too difficult to accomplish and, even if achieved, would create a volatile 
amount of jealousy on the part of the subsumed states.57 
Some years later Machiavelli structured his Istorie fiorentine, presented to Pope 
Clement VII in May of 1525, in an overtly Italian geographical framework.58 Echoing his 
thoughts from the Discourses, Machiavelli again decried what he understood as the church’s 
role in preventing Italian unification.59 Perhaps more important, he also reinforced his 
 
57 “But I do not know if an Italian monarchia would be a good or bad thing because, if under a republic, it 
would be glorious for the name of Italia and a good thing for that city that dominated, but it would be total 
calamity for all the other states as they would be oppressed under the shade of the other, dominant one” [Ma 
non so già se el non venire in una monarchia sia stata felicità o infelicità di questa provincia, perché se sotto una 
republica questo poteva essere glorioso al nome di Italia e felicità a quella città che dominassi, era all’altre tutte 
calamità, perché oppresse dalla ombra di quella]. Moreover, Guicciardini noted, the fact that “Italy is divided 
into many dominions” did not account for the peninsula’s victimization by “barbarians,” for similar 
“calamities” occurred while Italy was politically unified under imperial Rome. Finally, Guicciardini implied 
that the “flourishing” of so many Italian cities “in our own time” would not have occurred under a single, 
unifying rule [E se bene la Italia divisa in molti domini abbia in vari tempi patito molte calamità che forse in 
uno dominio solo non arebbe patito , benché le innudazione de’ barbari furono più a tempo dell imperio romano 
che altrimenti, nondimeno in tutti questi tempi ha avuto al riscontro tante città floride che non arebbe avuto 
sotto una republic ache io reputo che una monarchia gli sarebbe state più infelice che felice], Francesco 
Guicciardini, Considerazioni sui Discorsi di Machiavelli, Opere, vol. 1, ed. Emanuella Lugnani Scarano (Turin: 
Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1982), 629-630. 
 
58 In fact, Book I narrates peninsular history from the Fall of Rome until the fifteenth century with hardly a 
mention of Florence. Machiavelli was aware of the seeming paradox underlying the peninsular scope of his 
Florentine history; he self-consciously justified the structure of his work several times in the text of the Istorie,
stating that one cannot understand Florence’s past without a greater knowledge of Italian history as a whole. In 
the preface Machiavelli explained his intentions to include those parts of Italian history that are necessary for 
understanding Florentine history, Istorie fiorentine in Opere di Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. 2, ed. Alessandro 
Montevecchi, (Turin: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1971), 281, hereafter cited as Opere, vol. 2. Later, 
in the opening lines of Book VII: “perhaps it will appear to those who have read the above text that a Florentine 
writer has taken himself too far away in narrating those happenings in Lombardy and in the Kingdom (of 
Naples): nonetheless I have not fled nor shall I flee from similar narrations because, although I have never 
promised to write of the things of Italy, it does not appear to me that I should leave them behind…by not 
narrating them our history would be less understood and less gratifying, especially since the wars in which the 
Florentines were compelled to participate were born out of the actions of other peoples and princes of Italy” [E’ 
parrà forse a quegli che il libro superiore aranno letto che uno scrittore delle cose fiorentine si sia troppo diteso 
in narrare quelle seguìte in Lombardia e nel Regno: nondimeno io non ho fuggito né sono per lo avvenire per 
fuggire simili narrazioni perché, quantunque io non abbia mai promesso di scrivere le cose di Italia, non mi pare 
perciò da lasciare indietro di non narrare quelle che saranno in quella provincia natabili. Perché, non le 
narrando, la nostra istoria sarebbe meno intesa e meno grata, massimamente perché dalla azioni degli altri 
popoli e principi italiani nascono il più delle volte le guerre nelle quali i Fiorentini sono di intromettersi 
necessitati], Machiavelli, Istorie fiorentine, Opere, vol. 2, 633.  
 
59 “Because the popes always feared one whose power had become great in Italy, even if it was through the 
benefices of the church that their power grew, and because they sought to undercut their (the church’s) power, 
there arose those frequent changes and tumults that occurred in Italy. The fear of one power begat the growth of 
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conceptions of Italia as inherently strong and awaiting a rebirth of its virtù by connecting it 
to a larger theory of historical change. Underpinning the Istorie is an understanding of 
history as cyclical according to which the decline of states and peoples immediately precedes 
regeneration and re-ascent. Put in Machiavelli’s terms, there was an ongoing fluctuation 
between ordine and disordine that hinged on the manifestation or lack thereof—the ebb and 
flow—of collective virtù.60 Applying this theory to Italia, Machiavelli noted that since the 
fall of the Roman Empire, Italia had been “sometimes happy, sometimes miserable.”61 When 
shortly after Rome’s collapse “so much virtù” emerged “among the ruins” in the cities of the 
peninsula, the result was a “freed Italia, defended from the barbarians.”62 Centuries later, 
between 1434 and 1494, the virtù of those same cities “was eliminated,” and Italia was 
 
someone weak, and when that one had grown, he engendered fear and, being feared, they sought to bring him 
down”[perché i pontefici temevano sempre colui la cui i favori potenzia era diventata grande in Italia, ancora 
che la fussi con i favori dell Chiesa cresciuta, e perché e’ cercavano di abbassarla, ne nascevano gli spessi 
tumulti e le spesse variazioni che in quella sequivano; perché la paura di uno potente faceva crescere di 
abbassarlo], Machiavelli, Istorie fiorentine, Opere, vol. 2, 353.  
 
60 In the opening of Book V of the Istorie, Machiavelli wrote: “Most of the time, provinces go from order to 
disorder and then pass again from disorder back to order, for nature does not permit earthly things to stand 
still…thus from the good they are always descending to the bad and from the bad rising themselves up to the 
good. Because virtù produces peace, peace generates ozio and ozio gives way to disorder and then ruin; and 
similarly from ruin is born order and from order, virtù and from that glory”[Sogliono le province il più delle 
volte, nel variare che le fanno, dall’ordine venire al disordine, e di nuovo di poi dal disordine all’ordine 
trapassare: perché non essendo dalla natura conceduto alle mondane cose il fermarsi…e così sempre da il bene 
si scende al male, e da il male si sale al bene. Perché la virtù partorisce quiete, la quiete ozio, l’ozio disordine, il 
disordine rovina; e similmente dalla rovina nasce l’ordine, dall’ordine virtù, da questa Gloria e fortuna], 
Machiavelli, Istorie fiorentine, Opere, vol. 2, 514. On Machiavelli’s cyclical view of history as expressed in the 
Istorie see John Najemy’s “Machiavelli and the Medici: The Lessons of Florentine History,” Renaissance 
Quarterly 35 (1982): 574-576; and Salvatore Di Maria, “Machiavelli’s Ironic View of History,” Renaissance 
Quarterly 45 (1992): 248-270.  
 
61 “Ora felice, ora misera la Italia,” Machiavelli, Istorie fiorentine, Opere, vol. 2, 515. 
 
62 “Nondimeno surse tanta virtù in alcuna delle nuove città e de’ nuovi imperi i quali tra le romane rovine 
nacquono, che, sebbene uno non dominasse agli altri, erano nondimeno in modo insieme concordi e ordinate 
che da’ barbari la liberorono e difesono,” Ibid., 515.  
 
23
“again exposed to the barbarians…Italia again put itself into their slavery.”63 In the final 
lines of The Prince Machiavelli had applied that cyclical vision of history to Italy’s specific 
case. There, he had compared Italy’s desperate situation with that of the ancient Israelites, 
who had to be first enslaved in Egypt before they could be redeemed and experience 
collective regeneration.64 Sixteenth-century Italy’s “enslavement” at the hands of foreigners 
suggested that Italia had arrived at an historical nadir, which, according to Machiavelli’s 
historical outlook, actually implied imminent rejuvenation. He had found in Italy’s dark 
times various glimmerings of hope. 
Virtù was a thread running through Machiavelli’s writings from The Prince onward 
and, in his discussions of Italia; it implied his belief in the potential for Italian leaders to alter 
considerably the decline of the peninsula, which was overrun by invaders. It should be noted 
that one of the most recent scholarly interpretations of the Istorie, an article by Salvatore Di 
Maria,65 specifically engaged the question of whether or not Machiavelli was “hopeful” or 
 
63 “Tanto che quella virtù che per una lunga pace si soleva nelle altre provincie spegnere, fu dalla viltà di quelle 
in Italia spenta…alla fine si aperse di nuovo la via a’ barbari e riposesi la Italia nelle servitù di quegli,” Ibid., 
516. 
 
64 Well before he had explicitly articulated his cyclical theory of history in the Istorie fiorentine, Machiavelli 
seems to have thought that ruin (rovina) was a necessary precursor to regeneration—specifically for Italia. In 
the final chapter of The Prince he wrote that Italia had reached a new level of weakness such that “I cannot 
even imagine there was ever a time more appropriate than the present” for a redentore prince to come along. 
Machiavelli also provided historical examples to support his notion of a continual degeneration—regeneration 
cycle of collective virtù: “it was necessary for the manifestation of the virtù of Moses that the Israelites be first 
enslaved in Egypt…likewise in present times it was necessary that Italia reduce itself before bringing to the 
surface the virtù of the Italian spirit.” Before the return of that Italian virtù, Italy had to be brought to her knees, 
“more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, more dispersed than the Athenians, 
without a leader, without order, beaten, crushed, dispossessed, lacerated, overrun; she had to have endured 
every sort of ruination” [che io non so qual mai tempo fussi più atto a questo. E se (come io dixi) era necessario, 
volendo vedere, la virtù di Moysè, che il popul d’Isdrael fussi schiavo in Egipto…volendo conosciere la virtù di 
uno spirito italiano, era necessario che la Italia si riducessi ne’ termini presenti e che ella fussi più stiava che il 
Hebrei, più serva che Persia, più dispersa che gli Ateniesi; sanza capo, sanza ordine, battuta, spogliate, lacera, 
corsa; et avessi sopportato d’ogni sorte ruina], Machiavelli, Principe, XXVI, Opere, 388. See Dotti, 
fenomenologia, 106. 
 
65 See above note 61.  
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“despairing” about the capacity of humans to determine “the outcome of life’s events” at the 
time that he wrote the Istorie and the potential for Italia to determine its own political 
future.66 Di Maria proposed that the answer to that question “must proceed from evidence 
derived directly from a close reading of the text itself.”67 In the end, he detected in the ironic 
tone and structure of that work evidence enough to conclude Machiavelli’s utter 
disillusionment and fatalistic frame of mind, particularly in regard to the idea of Italia and its 
future vis-à-vis the invaders. According to Di Maria, Machiavelli recognized that 
“Renaissance Italy was experiencing a serious and irreversible cultural and political decline” 
and, further, that “Machiavelli, no doubt sharing in the prevailing mood of hopelessness, 
looks at both the present and the past, and sees no sign of an upward swing of the historical 
cycle.”68 In short, according to Di Maria, Machiavelli had by then determined that the world 
was “a stage in which man is doomed to a tragic end in a futile attempt to impose his will 
upon the immutable course of human history.”69 Di Maria’s sophisticated reading of the 
Istorie failed to take into account Machiavelli’s later writings from the 1520s. The next 
section of this essay continues to argue that Machiavelli in fact remained hopeful in his 
perspective on the future of Italia by examining some of his other, generally overlooked 
writings from the 1520s and, more important, by exploring the developing contrast between 
his and Vettori’s writings on Italia. The juxtaposition of Vettori’s and Machiavelli’s 
 
66 Di Maria, 249.  
 
67 Ibid., 249.  
 
68 Ibid., 267.  
 
69 Ibid., 268. Puzzlingly, Di Maria cites Najemy as agreeing with his point regarding Machiavelli’s hopelessness 
vis-à-vis Italia in 1525 when, in fact, Najemy’s article only posits Machiavelli’s skepticism about the ability of 
one man to redeem Italia—according to Najemy, the Istorie reveals Machiavelli’s continued “faith in the 
collective virtù” of Italians and “their capacity for renewal as a community, even, or perhaps especially after the 
worst battiture and disordini,” Najemy, “Lessons of History,” 576.  
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perspectives on that idea may lead to a questioning of Di Maria’s claims that Machiavelli 
recognized Italy’s predicament as “irreversible,” that he adopted a position of 
“hopelessness,” and that he had determined history and the case of Italy to be “immutable.”  
 
1520s: Between fortuna and virtù 
While Machiavelli remained excluded from political activity by virtue of his exile, 
spending most of his days reading and writing on his farm in Sant’Andrea in Percussina, 
Vettori became increasingly involved in the complex events of the period. Between 1515 and 
1519, Vettori served as an ambassador representing Florentine and Medici interests in 
France, and became one of the closest advisers to the de facto leader of his home city, 
Lorenzo de’ Medici, Duke of Urbino.70 After Lorenzo’s death in 1519, Vettori held various 
political offices in Florence,71 often traveling between there and Rome and eventually 
emerging as one of the Medici Pope Clement VII’s closest advisers.72 During those years, 
Vettori developed a notion of Italia that contrasted ever more sharply with Machiavelli’s. 
That growing contrast emerged initially in a series of missives directed to Pope Clement by 
both Vettori and Machiavelli. 
When in 1525 the armies of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V seemed poised for 
victory against the forces of the French monarch Francis I, Pope Clement VII found himself 
and Italy at a diplomatic crossroads. On the one hand, the pope could form an alliance with 
France and the Italian states in opposition to the emperor. On the other hand, Clement could 
 
70 Devonshire Jones, 109-142. 
 
71 Ibid., 143-161. 
 
72 Ibid., 161-198. 
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acquiesce and seek terms of peace.73 In that year Vettori wrote a memorandum to Clement, 
the so-called “Discourse of Francesco Vettori regarding whether or not it would be better to 
form a League [of allies to oppose the emperor] or to strike an accord with the emperor.”74 
Vettori seemed reconciled to the inevitability of Italia’s subjugation by foreign armies.  
In his treatise, Vettori advised the pope to come to terms with Charles V on the 
grounds that no Italian coalition could possibly overcome such a strong opponent. By 
Vettori’s own estimation, most people shared the opposite view.75 Vettori acknowledged in 
the Discorso that “the emperor aspires to dominion over all Italy, and not only Italy, but most 
of Christendom and that it would be the duty of all Italian leaders, and above all the pope, to 
prevent such an outcome.”76 But he differed from the other curial counselors in asserting “I 
cannot see any rimedio for Italy.”77 The resurfacing of that word, rimedio, is telling. 
Machiavelli had already found what he believed to be a rimedio for Italia in the form of a 
redeemer prince, but for Vettori such positive thinking was misguided hopefulness. As 
spectacular as a Papal-led coalition victory over the emperor would have been, “everything 
that appears glorious does not turn out to be always useful.”78 
73 For historical background on that period see Devonshire Jones, 161-174. 
 
74 “Discorso di Francesco Vettori se fusse meglio fare una lega o vero accordare con l’imperatore,” published in 
Scritti, 299-302. Niccolini attributed the title to Carlo Strozzi but says the handwriting of the body of the text is 
Vettori’s, see Niccolini, 442. Devonshire Jones, 174-176, and Stephens, 192-193, both agreed that the 
document, title aside, is in Vettori’s hand. I have also seen the document and agree with their assessments. 
 
75 In Vettori’s words “ninety percent of Roman opinion favored war,” Devonshire Jones, 183. 
 
76 “Noi possiamo pensare che Cesare aspiri al dominio di tutta Italia, e non solo d’Italia, ma della maggiore 
parte della Christianità, e che sarebbe officio di tutti e’ potentate italici, e massime del Pontifice, ovviare a 
questo suo disegno,” Scritti, 299. 
 
77 “Non vediamo che rimedio abbi Italia,” Ibid., 299. 
 
78 “Nondimeno tutto quello che apparisce glorioso non è poi utile,” Ibid., 300. 
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In the Discorso, Vettori underlined his hopelessness by writing of Italia 
metaphorically as an invalid near death for whom there was no cure. In this very brief treatise 
(eight paragraphs), Vettori linked images of mortality with the idea of Italy a striking number 
of times. He wrote that “this body of Italy is gravely ill; taking it into war could be the strong 
medicine that could liberate it, but it could also bring it swift death.”79 After advising the 
pope to strike a deal with the emperor, he emphasized the need to keep Charles’ financial 
demands reasonable, “so as not to bring us a quick death.”80 Finally, Vettori stated that if the 
emperor’s terms proved impossible to meet, Italian leaders would have to “put themselves 
into every danger, throwing themselves into the fray and deciding that it would be better to 
die by the hands of others than by one’s own.”81 
While Vettori seemed convinced of the necessity of reaching a peaceful accord with 
the invaders, thinking any Italian opposition hopeless, Machiavelli had joined Francesco 
Guicciardini at the military camps in Northern Italy in 1526. Clement VII had entrusted 
Guicciardini with the position of lieutenant-general in the papal army that was attempting to 
stem the tide of foreign advancements.82 Not only do Machiavelli’s actions during the last 
two years of his life suggest that he still harbored the hope that somehow, someway, the utter 
 
79 “Questo corpo d’Italia sia infermo gravamente e che, dandoli una medicina forte quale sarebbe il pigliare la 
guerra, lo potrebbe liberare, ma lo potrebbe ancora condurre alla morte sùbita,” Ibid., 300. 
 
80 “D’un modo che non fussi soma che ci conducessi alla morte sùbita,” Ibid., 300. 
 
81 “E sarebbe in tal caso da mettersi a ogni pericolo et a ogni sbaraglio et iudicare che fussi meglio morire per 
man d’altri che occidersi da sé medesimo,” Ibid., 301. Vettori later extended the association of Italia as a fatally 
ill body that he presented in the Discorso in the Sommario when he described the Italian military captains as 
comparable to “a group of unversed, amateur doctors who, without purging the body of its illness, try to cure it 
by applying strong unguents to the extremities without realizing that they are conveying them right to the 
heart”[come alcuni medici poco esperti e poco dotti che, senza purgare il corpo delli mali umori, sanano con 
loro unguenti forti le piache delli membri non nobili e non s’accorgano che riducono la materia al cuore], Ibid., 
238. 
 
82 For more information on this often overlooked period of Machiavelli’s life, see Dotti, rivoluzionario, 409-
428.  
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subjugation of the peninsula could be averted, but so, too, do his words. In the often 
overlooked letters from those years Machiavelli persistently couched his hopeful expressions 
of Italia in a rhetoric of virtù—never really abandoning the intellectual commitment to a 
potentially strong Italia that he first displayed in The Prince’s final chapter.  
In 1526 Machiavelli echoed the seemingly grandiloquent recommendations that he 
had made in The Prince in a decidedly formal context—a letter addressed to Pope Clement. 
In that letter Machiavelli advocated bold aggression as the key to defeating the foreign 
invaders.83 Machiavelli wrote that document one year after Vettori had penned his Discorso 
in which he had counseled the pope to come to terms of peace with Charles V. By contrast, 
Machiavelli offered the pope the outlines of a hard-hitting plan to distract and undermine 
Charles’ hegemonic aspirations in Italy. It was a complex and bold strategy involving the 
forces of the Holy League of Cognac,84 who would execute a diversionary attack on Charles’ 
interests in Naples while also sending other forces into Lombardy.85 Vettori assisted in 
delivering Machiavelli’s letter to Clement.86 Later in the same year, however, Vettori wrote 
to Machiavelli and expressed his misgivings about what, to Vettori, was a delusional plan 
that failed to take into account Charles’ access to massive amounts of money and troops. 
Vettori conveyed his feelings bluntly: “My friend, I do not approve of your plan; Charles has 
 
83 See a summary of it in Devonshire Jones, 178.  
 
84 The Holy League of Cognac was an alliance combining the resources of Rome, Venice, Florence, and Milan, 
established in the spring of 1526. For more on the League, see Cecil Roth, The Last Florentine Republic 
(London: Methuen, 1925), 9, 15-16, 68-71, 85-86, 104-105, 235-236.  
 
85 Devonshire Jones, 178. 
 
86 Vettori passed the letter to Filippo Strozzi who, according to Vettori in his letter of 5 August 1526, presented 
it to Pope Clement VII, Lettere, 360. 
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too much good fortuna.”87 A few years later in his Sommario, Vettori developed further his 
understanding of fortuna in the context of Italy’s recent history, which I will discuss below. 
In a subsequent letter from the same year, Machiavelli wrote to Guicciardini. The 
Spanish-German forces were advancing, and Machiavelli was anxious; with no help on the 
way from the French king, “Italy would be left to its ruin.” He feared that “Italy would be 
lost.”88 Yet Machiavelli did not see the situation as hopeless; again he invoked that word 
rimedio several times, musing to Guicciardini that “these times demand decisions that are 
bold, unusual, and strange.”89 Writing not in terms of Florence, but in terms of Italy, 
Machiavelli insisted on the necessity of action infused with virtù, instead of appeasement. 
The course of action he proposed to Guicciardini strikingly resembled that which he 
described in the final chapters of The Prince. He saw in Giovanni de’ Medici,90 the 
mercenary captain known as delle bande nere, “the only rimedio,”91 an opportunity for a 
single individual to harness Italian virtù: “Among the Italians there is no other leader whom 
the soldiers would follow more willingly…he is bold, impetuous, and a strategist.”92 Echoing 
the exact phrase from his 1513 letter to Vettori and from The Prince of that same year, 
Machiavelli repeated that revealing word rimedio in proposing a plan of action meant to 
 
87 “Ma solo vi voglio dire che l’Imperatore ha troppo gran fortuna; compare, io non appruovo quello andare con 
lo exercito verso il regno,” Lettere, 361, 363. 
 
88 “Lascia rovinare l’Italia…perduta che sia l’Italia,” Lettere, 346. 
 
89 “Questi tempi richieggono deliberationi audaci, inusitate, et strane,” Ibid., 347. 
 
90 Giovanni de’ Medici was a condottiere captain who established a military reputation in the service of 
Florence during the Medici annexation of Urbino in 1516-1517 and who, at the time of Machiavelli’s letter, was 
operating under the aegis of the League of Cognac, Devonshire Jones, 178; Roth, 10, 12, 73; Scritti, 178, 214. 
 
91 “Et se questo rimedio non ci è, havendo a far guerra, non so qual ci sia; né a me occorre altro,” Ibid., 348.  
 
92 “Fra gli Italiani non ci sia capo, a chi li soldati vadino più dietro, né di chi gli Spagnuoli più dubitino 
(temano), et stimino più: ciascuno tiene ancora il signor Giovanni audace, impetuoso, di gran concetti,” Ibid., 
347.  
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mitigate foreign hegemony in Italy, indicating his clinging adherence to the idea of Italy’s 
potential salvation. Machiavelli had also employed a word—impetuoso—that he had used in 
the “Exhortation” to describe the ideal characteristics of Italy’s redeemer prince.93 Although 
Machiavelli’s proposal appears nothing but sincere, there was little in Giovanni’s campaigns 
against the Hapsburg armies that would have provided any basis for taking such grandiose 
hopes seriously. As Devonshire Jones pointed out, at the time of Machiavelli’s letter to 
Clement VII, “despite the highest expectations, in no sector of the war which the pope had 
planned were the forces of the League successful.”94 Later in that year Giovanni, whom 
Machiavelli wrote about in such a hopeful vein, died from wounds suffered in battle.95 
93 Machiavelli, Principe, XXVI, 384. 
 
94 Devonshire Jones, 178. 
 
95 Vettori, Scitti, 234, 242. 
 
Vettori’s Italia rovinata 
 
Throughout the mid-1520s Machiavelli’s hopeful insistence that something could still 
be done to avert the peninsula’s subjugation by foreign armies reflected the continuation of 
beliefs that he had held back in 1513. By contrast, in 1513 Vettori had expressed the hope 
that perhaps the Italian states could act in accord and hold off the serious military threat 
posed by the Swiss. But by 1525, in his Discorso directed to Pope Clement, Vettori had 
abandoned any vestiges of that optimism in exchange for a clear resignation regarding Italy’s 
inability to repulse or even effectively combat its invaders. Vettori’s resignation regarding 
Italia in 1525 became more nuanced and even more despairing by 1528 when he wrote his 
Sommario.
Vettori’s history was unique for the early sixteenth century. It was the first of its 
period to employ Italia as the unifying frame of its analysis that was also written in the 
vernacular.96 Francesco Guicciardini’s Storia d’Italia, the best-known early modern history 
of a unified Italian entity appeared eight years after Vettori’s Sommario, in 1536.97 Like 
Vettori, Guicciardini was also a close friend of Machiavelli’s; like Vettori, he also held 
important posts in Medicean Rome and Florence, and, finally, the two collaborated 
 
96 As noted above, Rucellai’s De Bello Italico, a Latin work with which Vettori likely read, appeared in 1495.  
 
97 See Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 271-301. Eric Cochrane, “L’Eredità del Guicciardini: dalla stroria 
‘nazionale’ alle storie ‘definitive,” in Francesco Guicciardini, 1483-1983, 271-291. 
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significantly within the Palazzo Vecchio, especially after 1527.98 Such circumstantial 
evidence may indicate that Guicciardini read Vettori’s Sommario and, as Franco Gaeta has 
argued, perhaps Vettori’s thinking on Italia, not only as a guiding geographical framework 
for a history but also as an irreversibly weak entity, influenced Guicciardini’s own, later 
historical opus.99 The fact that Vettori wrote in the Tuscan language that subsequently 
diffused throughout the peninsula as standard Italian lends his interpretation of Italia wider 
import for subsequent peninsular history.100 In particular, Vettori’s representation of Italia in 
his treatise marks a clear break away from the classical, medieval, and Machiavellian 
rhetorical tradition that, despite the medieval and Renaissance realities of political 
fragmentation, had invoked Italia as a strong entity, imbued with an inherent virtù—an Italia 
that recalled the military preeminence and political unity of imperial Rome.  
Vettori began to write the Sommario in the wake of a particularly tumultuous year. In 
1527 Spanish and German soldiers had sacked Rome,101 and, in Florence, a group of citizens 
had exiled the Medici clan from the city, temporarily replacing their de facto rule with an 
oligarchic government led by Niccolò Capponi.102 The new regime adopted a position hostile 
 
98 Devonshire Jones, 226-294. 
99 Gaeta, 156-157. 
 
100 The debates among sixteenth-century intellectuals about whether or not the Tuscan dialect should become a 
unifying Italian language—the so-called questione della lingua—had already begun and continued throughout 
the century. For a general review of the questione, see Bruno Migliorini, Storia della lingua italiana (Florence: 
Sansoni, 1971), 321-340, and Martines, 317-322. Modern historians have noted Vettori’s use of Italia as the 
major category of historical investigation. Albertini wrote that “Vettori anticipates by some years the shifting of 
historical interests from the Florentine horizon to the Italian one that will have its first complete expression in 
Guicciardini’s Storia d’ Italia”[Il Vettori anticipa di qualche anno quello spostamento dell’interesse storico 
dall’orizzinte fiorentino a quello italiano che avrà la sua prima espressione compuita nella Storia d’Italia del 
Guicciardini], Albertini, 251. Also see Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 248-250.  
 
101 The most recent work on the Sack is Kenneth Gouwens, Remembering the Renaissance: Humanist 
Narratives of the Sack of Rome (Boston: Brill, 1998). 
 
102 On the 1527 revolt see Devonshire Jones, 198-200; Stephens, 195-214; and Roth, 37-54. 
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to most of the former Medici loyalists, whose number included Vettori, making his presence 
in the city difficult, if not impossible.103 Vettori retreated to the countryside where, in his 
own words, “finding myself this spring at the villa with time on my hands, I thought I would 
write, not a complete history, but a short and select sommario of the events in Italy from the 
end of 1511 to the start of 1527.”104 The particular moment at which Vettori sat down to 
write imbues the Sommario with several layers of meaning, both historical and personal.  
In the first place, as Machiavelli had done before him and Guicciardini would do 
later, Vettori sought a means through historical writing to comprehend better the series of 
events that had, almost in a flash, left him destitute and unwanted by his native city.105 It also 
seems plausible that Vettori’s temporary rejection by the new administration in the Palazzo 
Vecchio may have inspired him to adjust his historical lens wider than Florence or Tuscany. 
As J. N. Stephens proposed, the frustration of certain statesmen with the inabilities of their 
governments to navigate successfully or even to comprehend the political changes occurring 
around them led those thinkers to ask themselves “what was left?” and, Stephens continued, 
“Italy not Florence, that was the necessary conclusion and it became the subject of 
history.”106 
103 Scritti, 246; Devonshire Jones, 201-204. See also Vettori’s letter to Bartolomeo Lanfredini, in which Vettori 
described his dire financial straights stemming from the new regime’s taxation of the optimates (ottimati). 
Vettori and his wife, “without money” and “without anything else in the house,” had to sell their clothes before 
leaving Florence, in Albertini, appendix, 438. 
 
104 “Onde, trovandomi questa primavera alla villa ozioso, pensai di scrivere non intera et iusta istoria, ma brieve 
et eletto sommario delli successi dal fine dell’anno MDXI insino al principio del MDXXVII in Italia,” Vettori, 
from the introductory letter of the Sommario, Scritti, 134.  
 
105 In Albertini’s words, Vettori, like Machiavelli and Guicciardini, turned to historical writing to “make clear 
the recent past and to understand his own condition in a moment in which he found himself excluded from 
political activity and in which events had taken a completely unexpected turn” [di rendersi conto del recente 
passato e di comprendere la propria condizione in un momento in cui si trovava escluso dalla politica attiva e in 
cui gli eventi politici avevano preso una piega del tutto inattesa], Albertini, 250.  
 
106 Stephens, 157.  
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Two aspects of Vettori’s history in particular help to distinguish his conception of 
Italia from Machiavelli’s: first, its European geographical scope and, second, its emphasis on 
the greater influence of fortuna rather than virtù in Italian political affairs. Vettori’s project 
of elucidating the recent past began with the assumption that the reasons behind the 
calamitous events in Italy could only be understood in the wider context of European 
diplomatic events.107 Vettori derived his subtle understanding of transalpine politics at least 
in part from his own ambassadorial experiences108 at the courts of the Holy Roman Emperor 
Maximilian in 1507-1509109 and France’s King Francis I in 1516-1518.110 Compared to 
Machiavelli, Vettori had a much broader perspective of political geography. In his attempts 
to understand the crises facing Italy, Machiavelli had looked no further than the Alps in 
locating possible causes and solutions to Italy’s woes. For Machiavelli, the collective failure 
of Italian virtù and its possible rejuvenation, that is, the rimedio, were to be found in Italy, 
through the actions of Italian leaders. But in the prefatory letter of the Sommario, Vettori 
asserted the necessity of looking beyond the Alps in order to understand why events had 
transpired in the way that they had. He wrote, 
it is impossible to ignore that which occurred outside of 
Italy because those things are in a way connected together with 
that which occurred inside [the peninsula], such that one can 
 
107 For this reason Felix Gilbert deemed the Sommario “the first European diplomatic history.” Gilbert, 
Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 248. 
 
108 Vettori narrated many of those ambassadorial missions in the Sommario, writing himself into the history in 
the third person, Scritti, 143-144, 162, 164, 169, 183, 208-209, 232, 241. 
 
109 An assignment Vettori shared with Machiavelli, Devonshire Jones, 10-34. 
 
110 Vettori, Scritti, 169, 183; Devonshire Jones, 109-143. 
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only write poorly about the events in Italy while omitting 
external events entirely.111 
In other words, according to Vettori, the Italian crises of the early sixteenth century resulted 
from a complex series of events throughout Europe, from England to Turkey.  
Vettori’s particular emphasis on the interconnectivity of continental politics led him 
to portray the Italian states and their leaders as forcibly and unavoidably passive in 
determining the future of Italia. Rather, the “major princes”112 beyond the Alps—Ferdinand 
of Aragon, Francis I of France, and Charles V Hapsburg—and not Italian leaders, were in 
control of the political fortunes of Italia. The rivalries of those monarchs determined the 
course of Italian politics. Looking back at the aftermath of the unexpected French victory 
over the Swiss at Marignano in 1515, Vettori endeavored to explain why Francis I did not 
follow his victory with further peninsular acquisitions. “Certain” that Francis’ forces could 
have “destroyed the Spanish army and that of the church,” Vettori thought it logical that “if 
Francis followed that victory, he would easily have become signore of Italy.”113 From the 
perspective of almost fifteen years later, Vettori reflected that if Francis had become signore 
of the peninsula, his presence might have granted Italy some level of stability and protection: 
“in the hands of such a good and excellent prince, under his shade, Italy would have been 
able to repose itself in many years of peace.”114 Vettori explained that such a desirous turn of 
 
111 “Quantunque cognosca non essere possibile non parlare ancora di quello che è occorso fuori d’Italia perché 
le cose, delle quali si tratta, sono in modo collegate insieme, che male si può scrivere di quelle d’Italia, 
omettendo l’altre interamente,” Vettori, Scritti, 135.  
 
112 “Principi grandi,” Ibid., 182. 
 
113 “A destruere lo essercito ispano e quello della Chiesa. . .il Re a seguitare la vittoria la quale se lui seguiva, 
era facil cosa che lui diventasse signore d’Italia,” Ibid., 168. 
 
114 “Che quella [Italia] venisse in mano di sì bono et eccellente Principe, sotto l’ombra del quale sarebbe potuta 
riposarsi molti anni in pace,” Ibid., 168. 
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events never occurred because the other northern European rulers, locked in a competition 
for greater influence, would never let a rival take total possession of the contested prize, 
Italy. Francis never tried 
to enter into such a venture because the Swiss, 
exasperated after their defeat [at Marignano], would descend 
again more fiercely than ever, [and] Germany would unite 
itself upon understanding that Francis wanted to occupy Italy; 
the King of England, fearing Francis’ influence, would move 
against him in France, and King Ferdinand would do the 
same.115 
Noticeably absent as a factor in deciding Italy’s fate was Italia itself. Instead, in Vettori’s 
eyes, a mixture of ambition and wariness on the part of the more powerful European leaders 
dictated the course of political events on the peninsula. 
 By portraying Italia in a decidedly passive vein, Vettori negated the relevance of 
Italian virtù as a possible rimedio. Machiavelli had hinged the fate of Italia on either the 
collective failure or the collective revitalization of its inherent virtù, placing the 
responsibility for Italy’s salvation or ruin squarely on the shoulders of Italian leaders. By 
contrast, Vettori saw Italian leaders as powerless to determine their own political futures. The 
agents determining Italy’s fate lay beyond the Alps. Thus, the bold, strong Italia of ancient 
Rome and of Machiavellian virtù was reduced, in Vettori’s mind, to a forcibly passive player 
in its own political destiny, helplessly exposed to the whims of fortuna.116 
Machiavelli’s engagement in The Prince of the struggle between fortuna and virtù is 
its most famous iteration from the early modern period. Machiavelli had unequivocally 
 
115 “Cioè che non era da entrare in nuove imprese perché li Svizzeri, esaperai per questa rotta, scenderebbono di 
nuovo più feroci che mai, che l’Alamagna si unirebbe tutta, quando intendesse volesse occupare Italia, che il re 
d’Inghilterra, temendo la grandezza sua, li moverebbe in Francia et it re Ferrando farebbe il medesimo,” Ibid., 
168. 
 
116 For fortuna in Renaissance political philosophy, see Skinner, 87, 95, 121-122, 186-189; Pocock, 94-97, 166-
169.  
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asserted the potential of individual leaders and whole societies to harness the influence of 
fortuna through their own virtù, a principle he immediately applied to Italy’s situation, as 
discussed above. In a broad sense, Machiavelli gendered his conception of Italia masculine. 
By contrast, Vettori seized upon fortuna—whose metaphoric representations from antiquity 
to the early sixteenth century were feminine in nature—as a greater force in determining the 
future of Italia.117 For Vettori, then, though he expressed it implicitly, Italia’s foremost 
characteristics were more feminine—prostrate, passive, weak, and exposed to the whims of 
others, unable to determine her own political future.  
While Vettori asserted that fortuna oversaw all historical events, stating that “all 
human actions fall under fortuna’s sway,” he also had a practical understanding of what 
fortuna meant.118 Although he was familiar with Machiavelli’s reflections on that dialectic 
from The Prince, there were other, distinct interpretations of the meaning of fortuna in 
circulation in Italy in the early sixteenth century. Vettori had, in fact, recently read the 
Neapolitan humanist Giovanni Pontano’s 1512 treatise, On Fortuna. Pontano’s reflections 
rang true with what Vettori was observing in Rome as he moved in diplomatic circles. He 
informed Machiavelli that “Pontano clearly demonstrates that nothing is possible without 
 
117 In Roman mythology, fortuna was a female divinity and that mode of representation persisted through the 
Renaissance, Pocock, 37. The most famous of those representations is one with which Vettori was of course 
familiar, Machiavelli’s well-known maxim from The Prince, that fortuna was a woman and to control her, one 
had to approach her violently, with aggression and impetuousness [perché la fortuna è donna et è necessario, 
volendola tenere sotto, batterla et urtarla…più feroci e com più audacia la comandano], Principe, XXV, Opere,
384. Many scholars have explored the connections between virtù and masculinity and fortuna and femininity in 
Machiavelli’s writings, most recently “Meditations on Machiavelli” by Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, 49-93; “Niccolò 
Machiavelli: Women as Men, Men as Woman and the Ambiguity of Sex” by Arlene W. Saxonhouse, 93-117; 
“Renaissance Italy: Machiavelli” by Wendy Brown, 117-173; and “Beyond Virtù” by John Juncholl Shin, 287-
309, all contained in Feminist Interpretations of Niccolò Machiavelli (University Park, 2004), ed. Maria J. 
Falco. On the gender connotations of virtù and fortuna in Renaissance thought more broadly, see Skinner, 87, 
95, 121-122, 186-189, and Pocock, 94-97, 166-169. 
 
118 “Fortuna, alla quale sono tutte le azioni umane sottosposte,” Vettori, Scritti, 135.  
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fortuna, no matter the soul, no matter prudence, no matter force, no matter whatever kind of 
virtù. In Rome, one sees the proof of this every day.”119 In other words, there were certain 
times, like those in Rome after 1513, when it appeared that no human action could dispose 
fortuna from her dominance. Like Pontanto, Vettori also thought that historical figures 
possessed either good or bad fortuna. Fortuna allied herself in a positive or negative manner 
depending on the amount of resources available to a given leader. According to Vettori, for 
example, “war depends greatly on fortuna, and most of the time, one wins or one loses 
according how much of it is at your disposal.”120 Thus Vettori accorded Charles V, with his 
access to more money, land, and soldiers than any other European leader, good fortuna,121 in 
contrast to “Italy’s bad fortuna.”122 Vettori noted that most armies lose when their prince 
fails to lead them in person, but not in Charles’ case; his fortuna proved force enough to 
ensure victory despite his absence from the battlefield.123 
By contrast, fortuna plagued Italy and Italian leaders, who had recourse to less money 
and fewer troops than Charles. Vettori highlighted the collective weakness of the Italian 
states by emphasizing fortuna’s hold over Italian political leaders—a point on which 
Machiavelli drew decidedly contrasting conclusions.124 Clement VII, a key figure in Vettori’s 
 
119 “Legi, superioribus diebus, librum Pontani De Fortuna, noviter impressum…in quo aperte ostendit nihil 
valere ingenium neque prudentiam neque fortitudinem necque alias virtutes, ubi fortuna desit. Rome, de hac re, 
quotidie esperimentum videmus,” Lettere, 270. 
 
120 “Perché la guerra consiste assai nella fortuna et il più delle volte si vince e perde, secondo che quella ne 
dispone,” Vettori, Scritti, 215. 
 
121 For instance, Ibid., 188. 
 
122 “La mala fortuna d’Italia,” Ibid., 191.  
 
123 Ibid., 188. 
 
124 Felix Gilbert in particular emphasized, perhaps a bit simplistically, the historical agency Vettori accords to 
fortuna. Gilbert wrote that “Vettori had no confidence in man’s virtue; to Vettori, fortuna was all-powerful, and 
man a toy in fortuna’s hands,” Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 251. The point would be more accurate 
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history, is a subject about whom both Vettori and Machiavelli wrote. Their differing 
perceptions of his early pontificate help to explicate the importance each thinker accorded to 
either virtù or fortuna as forces controlling Italy political circumstances. Clement’s 
pontificate—which, from the Italian perspective, saw such catastrophes as the spread of 
Lutheranism, the 1527 Sack of Rome, and the controversy with English King Henry VIII—
has given way to a dubious, if ambiguous, legacy.125 Even before the Sack of Rome, Clement 
was viewed by many political commentators, including Machiavelli, as a vacillating, 
indecisive and weak leader, a primary source of blame for Italy’s misfortunes.126 
Writing to his friend Bartolomeo Cavalcanti in the winter of 1526 and then to Vettori 
in the spring of the following year, Machiavelli made clear his understanding that the fate of 
Italia rested in a large measure on the shoulders of Pope Clement and the decisions he made. 
With imperial soldiers moving virtually unobstructed in Northern Italy, Machiavelli saw the 
time as ripe for Clement to undertake a bold approach. Specifically, Machiavelli wrote 
Cavalcanti, “the pope should attack the Kingdom with all his forces…for that reason I wrote 
 
had Gilbert acknowledged that Vettori saw fortuna as a dual-natured, that is, that all humans were not the same 
in their relationship with fortuna; the accord between Italian leaders with fortuna was different in Vettori’s eyes 
from Charles V’s positive alliance with fortuna.
125 For the political, cultural, and general historiographical issues that interest modern scholars regarding 
Clement’s pontificate, including his ambiguous historiographical reputation, see the recently edited volume of 
essays The Pontificate of Clement VII, ed. Kenneth Gouwens and Sheryl E. Reiss (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2005). Relating to Vettori and Machiavelli, see especially Gouwens’ introduction, 3-19; T.C. Price 
Zimmermann’s “Guicciardini, Giovio, and the Character of Clement VII,” 19-29; Barbara McClung Hallman’s 
“The’Disastrous Pontificate of Clement VII: Disastrous for Giulio de’Medici?” 29-41; Patricia J. Osmond’s 
“The Conspiracy of 1522 against Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici: Machiavelli and ‘gli esempli delli antique,” 55-
75; and Cecil H. Clough’s “Clement VII and Francesco Maria della Rovere, Duke of Urbino,” 75-109. 
 
126 Vettori noted in the Sommario that already in 1528, in the wake of the devastating Sack of Rome, public 
opinion in Florence had turned overwhelmingly against Clement. Vettori remarked that “those who pass 
judgment on events in Florence, which is in fact almost all men, deemed Clement to be of little prudence and 
little spirit”[Come in Firenze s’intese il caso, quelli che iudicono delli eventi, che infatto sono é più delli 
uomini, dannavono Clemente di poca prudenzia e di poco animo], Vettori, Scritti, 232.  
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Francesco Vettori.”127 Machiavelli was still convinced that his aggressive proposal, which he 
had submitted to the pope via Vettori (discussed above), could trigger a turn of events in 
Italy’s favor. Ultimate responsibility for Italy’s security, in Machiavelli’s eyes, still lay with 
the pope. He noted that “if [that plan] is not executed, I see the war as lost.”128 When the 
pope disregarded Machiavelli’s plan, Machiavelli intimated to Vettori that the pope had 
chosen “a course that, if it succeeds, will result in our security and, if it does not, will mean 
our demise.”129 Events could unfold successfully or disastrously130 for Italy and, if the latter, 
“we would in this way, let ourselves be controlled by fortuna.”131 Unequivocally, then, 
Machiavelli thought that in some ways the pope had at least the opportunity to affect the 
success or failure of the Italians’ efforts to assuage the advancement of Charles’ forces. It 
seems that for Machiavelli in 1526 and 1527, individual virtù was still a meaningful 
consideration in assessing Italy’s future—fortuna’s grip on the peninsula was not, in 
Machiavelli’s mind, definitive or cemented. In fact, Machiavelli’s outlook on the potential 
for Pope Clement to mediate Italy’s situation vis-à-vis the invaders echoed almost exactly his 
words to Vettori in 1513 when he placed the outcome of Italy’s seemingly imminent 
confrontation with the Swiss on Pope Julius’ shoulders, telling Vettori that it was up to Julius 
 
127 “Donde che io scrissi a Francesco Vettori, che io credevo che questa impresa non si potesse tollerare…o per 
diversione, cioè lasciare in questi stati guardate queste frontiere, che questi Ispagnuoli non potessino fare 
progressi, e con tutte le forze asalire il Regno, il quale credevo si potessi prima pigliare, che una di queste terre 
qua,” Niccolò Machiavelli, Opere, vol. 3, ed. Franco Gaeta (Turin: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 
1985), 617. 
 
128 “Oltre a di questo, la guerra nutriva contesa,” Ibid., 167. 
 
129 “Il quale se riuscirà, sarà per hora la salute nostra; quando non riesca, ci farà in tutto abbandonare da oguno,” 
Lettere, 380. 
 
130 “Se gli è per riuscire o no, voi lo potete giudicare come noi,” Ibid., 380. 
 
131 “E lasciare per questa via governare alla fortuna,” Ibid., 380. 
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to find and execute some sort of rimedio.132 In chastising Clement, Machiavelli was also 
reaffirming his continued belief, however naïve, in the potential for human agency to alter 
Italy’s desperate situation.  
Vettori saw Clement differently; as much as the pope may have erred in his decisions 
and indecisions, Vettori refused to blame him for failing to navigate Italia successfully 
through what, to Vettori, was a set of insuperable circumstances. For Vettori he was an 
example of a potentially good Italian leader felled by bad fortuna. Giulio de’ Medici 
(thereafter Clement VII) ascended to “a pontificate full of war; he found Italia full of 
armies…the Turk in Hungary, and the Roman church little-esteemed because of the growing 
influence of the Lutheran sect.”133 Vettori succinctly described the effects of Clement’s 
elevation into an almost impossible situation: “He expended a great effort only to go from a 
good and respected cardinal to a small and little-esteemed pope.”134 Although fortuna had 
been kind to Giulio de’Medici in his prepontifical life, as soon as he ascended to the papal 
throne, his fortuna changed from that of a “compassionate mother into a cruel 
stepmother.”135 At the end of the Sommario, Vettori partially exonerated Clement for the 
Sack of Rome on the grounds that Clement himself was powerless to oppose the forces 
converging on Rome, noting that, ironically, “he who considers the lives of past popes would 
judge truly that in more than one hundred years there has not been a pope who was a better 
 
132 See above, page 15. 
 
133 “Trovò l’Italia piena d’esserciti e la Cristianità indebolita per la perdita di Rodi e per la preparazione che 
faceva il re de’ Turchi contro all’Ungheria. Trovò ancora la Chiesa romana in pochissima riputazione rispetto 
alla sette luterana, che aveva occupata gran parte d’Alamagna e del continuo andava crescendo,” Vettori, Scritti,
207.  
 
134 “Nondimeno durò una gran fatica per diventare, di grande e riputato cardinale, piccolo e poco stimato papa,” 
Ibid., 207.  
 
135 “La fortuna, pietosa madre cominciò a diventare crudele matrigna, così fece a Clemente,” Ibid., 207. Also 
see note 117 above. 
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man than Clement VII…nonetheless the ruin came during his time while the other popes, full 
of vices, lived and died happily.”136 Despite whatever personal leadership qualities Clement 
may have possessed, there was nothing he could have done to avert “the ruin.”  
Interestingly, the issues of Clement’s culpability and the fairness of his received 
reputation has persisted. As recently as 2005, historians such as Kenneth Gouwens have 
begun to argue for a reconsideration of that legacy. What has been taken as poor leadership 
on Clement’s part, according to Gouwens, may require further inspection of the extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, historical circumstances that were facing his pontificate.137 In 
essence, that was Vettori’s argument back in 1528. On the surface, Vettori’s conclusions may 
seem mere Medici praise. As noted, Vettori was a confidant of the Medici pope as well as of 
other Medici leaders. Vettori himself noted that “there will be some who call me too 
sympathetic to the actions of Pope Clement VII, to which I respond that I have said nothing 
that is not true.”138 Several biographical considerations give reason for his readers to take his 
conclusions about Pope Clement at face value rather than to simply dismiss them as mere 
appeasements to a powerful patron. 
Perhaps the most convincing case that Vettori makes in his Sommario to substantiate 
his claims of relative neutrality regarding the pope is his inclusion of several anecdotes in 
which Clement failed to heed Vettori’s advice. Vettori narrated several encounters with Pope 
Clement in which he counseled the pope to come to terms with Charles V—advice that went 
unheeded with disastrous consequences. In 1526, as the imperial army operated dangerously 
 
136 “Chi considerrà la vita de’ pontefici passati, potrà veramente iudicare che sono più che cento anni che nel 
pontificato non sedette il migliore uomo che Clemente settimo. . .nondimeno la ruina è venuta a tempo suo e li 
altri, che sono stati pieni di vizi, si può iudicare che, quanto al mondo, sieno vivuti e morti felici,” Ibid., 245.  
 
137 Gouwens, Clement, 3-19. 
 
138 “Saranno forse alcuni che mi calunnieranno come troppo affezionato alle azioni di papa Clemente VII, alli 
quail io rispondo non avere detto cosa che non sia vera,” Vettori, Scritti, 136. 
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close to Florentine territory, Florentine officials desired a break with the policies of their 
pope and de facto Medici lord: “the Otto di Practica, charged with the governance of the 
city, began to have certain doubts and did not want to follow the pope to their manifest 
ruin.”139 Referring to himself in the third person, Vettori explains that the Otto sent him to 
the pope to present the delicate Florentine perspective: “Clement, hearing this proposal, was 
displeased but, having Francesco as a confidant, thought that he was telling him these things 
out of affection… Despite having so much respect, he did not believe that things in Florence 
were as dangerous as Vettori had demonstrated.”140 The pope did not follow Vettori’s 
counsel in the crucial year of 1526, just as he had not in the case of the 1525 Discorso in 
which Vettori had advised the pope to reach an agreement of peace with the emperor. 
Perhaps resulting from the rift in perspectives between Clement and Vettori regarding 
wartime policies and, specifically, the pope’s involving a reluctant Florence (and Florentine 
money) in his war efforts, Vettori aided the successful 1527 anti-Medici coup in Florence.141 
Ironically, the new government then forced Vettori to leave the city. He wrote the Sommario 
shortly thereafter. Thus, Vettori’s standing as a Medici servant was, for the time being, 
unclear at best. 
It seems evident that by the mid-1520s Vettori had developed a bleak conception of 
Italia that departed from the inherited tradition of writing Italia as strong. Around the same 
time, Machiavelli maintained the relatively hopeful vision of Italia that he had first expressed 
 
139 “E li Otto di Practica, che eron quelli che avevono il pondo di governno della città, cominciorono a dubitare, 
che volendo seguitare in osservare e’ suoi ricordi, non andare alla ruina manifesta,” Ibid., 232. 
 
140 “Clemente, udita questa proposta, gli dispiaceque ma, avendo Francesco per confidante, pensò gli dicessi 
queste cose per afezione…et avendo ancora per troppo respettivo, non credette che le cose in Firenze fussino in 
tanto pericolo, quanto egli dimonstrava,” Ibid., 232. 
 
141 Devonshire Jones, 186-224. 
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in The Prince. Between 1513 and 1528 Vettori’s thinking of Italia altered considerably, from 
an initial stance of optimism to one of almost complete resignation. During the same years, 
Machiavelli’s thinking and writing about Italia seemed to remain relatively static and, thus, 
somewhat out of touch. Writing in the midst of swirling crises, both envisioned Italia as 
essentially weak. Beyond that, their understandings of Italia and how they arrived at those 
understandings differed greatly. Vettori wrote of Italia as a virtual corpse, unable to 
determine its own political destiny. By contrast, Machiavelli’s articulations of Italia 
consistently included the theme of potential—that is, in his discussions of Italia, Machiavelli 
stressed the possibility of determinative action through which Italian forces could greatly 
mitigate damage wrought by foreign invaders. Further, Vettori couched many of his 
references to Italia in terms of fortuna while Machiavelli employed fortuna’s dialectical 
opposite, virtù. Finally, to understand the reasons for the crises plaguing the Italian states and 
to understand Italia itself, Vettori looked beyond the Alps. By contrast, Machiavelli’s 
invocations of Italia lack any sustained analysis or even recognition of ultramontane political 
machinations and the severely uneven balance of power between those polities and the Italian 
states. Rather, he wrote of Italia through an optimistic if relatively narrow lens, clinging to 
his faith in the possibility of redemptive, heroic action.  
In his Sommario, Vettori recast the word Italia by introducing the theme of 
irrevocable weakness as its defining characteristic, thereby refiguring it in a way that 
corresponded to the stark realities of the period. He registered the Italian states’ collective 
descent into subjugation by writing of a disempowered, fallen Italia, pathetically powerless 
before the national monarchies and the invading armies sweeping over the Alps. Vettori 
understood that the common transalpine threat and the changes brought on by the series of 
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invasions in the early sixteenth century made the Italian states more united by their common 
plight, almost by default, than at any other point in the peninsula’s post-Roman history. 
Vettori recognized that the Italian states had effectively lost their separate political 
autonomy, that no single state could develop an external policy independent of the others, 
and that the collective Italian system of states no longer existed in geopolitical isolation from 
the rest of the continent. Vettori introduced a characterization of Italia grounded in the 
contradistinction between the northern states’ abilities to dictate the terms of their political 
existences and the Italian states’ shared inability to do the same. 
Ultimately, Vettori’s views on Italia seem more realistic than Machiavelli’s, 
measured against the changed political situation in Italy by the 1520s. Machiavelli’s thinking 
remained frozen in 1513, whereas Vettori’s evolved, making him, in many ways, and perhaps 
against conventional wisdom, the more perceptive of the two political analysts by the time of 
Machiavelli’s death. But the question may still linger—why after 1513 did Vettori’s and 
Machiavelli’s outlooks, at least on the question of Italia, diverge so drastically? On the 
surface, the Sack of Rome appears to be the event of serious traumatic proportions that might 
have caused an alert observer such as Vettori to question the Italian states’ abilities to dictate 
their own political futures.142 The Sack, however, sheds little light on how Vettori’s thinking 
grew in a direction so different from Machiavelli’s. Vettori’s thoughts about Italia and its 
unavoidable subjugation seemed well formed before the Sack, as evidenced by his Discorso 
of 1525 and his letters to Machiavelli of 1526.  
Instead, the answer, to the extent that one is possible, seems to lay in the dramatically 
different paths that their lives took after 1513. Remaining physically close to the centers of 
 
142 Not to mention the possible traumatic aftershock of such a devastating event. Kenneth Gouwens, 
Remembering the Renaissance discussed the psychological implications and contemporary perceptions of the 
April 1527 Sack. 
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diplomacy, Vettori’s knowledge of the constantly shifting subtleties of continental politics 
expanded after 1513. Machiavelli, meanwhile, remained largely confined to a rural life in 
political exile. Back in 1513, Machiavelli concluded one of his letters to Vettori with an 
apologetic admission. If Vettori found Machiavelli’s reflections on contemporary political 
events perplexing or simply off-base, then Machiavelli beseeched Vettori to “excuse me, for 
my mind is alienated from such practical matters as I am reduced to living on my farm, far 
from every human face; not knowing what is going on, I am forced to discuss in the dark.”143 
No matter the rhetorical nature of that statement, the fact remained that Machiavelli had been 
in political exile less than a year and already felt “alienated” from the swiftly changing 
political circumstances of the period.  
Up through the 1520s, Machiavelli’s seems to have remained “in the dark,” at least 
relative to Vettori and at least concerning the theme of Italia. It would seem that Machiavelli 
grew ever more out of touch with the shifting particularities of contemporary politics and in 
particular the realities of a stark and insuperable balance of power between the polities north 
of the Alps and those to the south, leading him to remain committed to a largely static 
perception of Italia that he had first articulated in the “Exhortation,” a relatively hopeful 
vision of an Italia that echoed the poetic, emotional appeals of his Tuscan predecessors 
Dante and Petrarch. Vettori was more attuned to the political realities of the period. It was 
Vettori who introduced a break from more traditional modes of writing Italia, an entity 
which, according to Vettori, was now devoid of hope, exposed to the whims of fortuna, and 
beyond the redemptive powers of virtù.
143 “Scusimi lo essere io alieno con l’animo da tucte queste pratiche, come ne fa fede lo essermi riducto in villa, 
et discosto da ogni viso humano, et per non sapere le cosec he vanno adtorno, in modo che io ho ad discorrere al 
buio, et ho fondato tucto in su li advisi mi date voi,” Lettere, 131. 
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The increasing contrast between Vettori’s Italia and Machiavelli’s during the 1520s 
helps us to understand something of the changing nature of their intellectual dynamic in its 
final stages and, especially, to appreciate the development and maturation of Vettori’s 
nuanced thoughts on the complicated events of the early sixteenth century. But Vettori’s 
historical portrayal of Italia is suggestive of some conclusions beyond the context of his 
relationship with Machiavelli. First, Vettori’s refitting of Italia suggests that in the sixteenth 
century the term had a dynamic nature, belying modern historians’ dismissals of the term as 
static or irrelevant during that period. Second, the portrayal of Italia as a passive, exposed, 
and feminine entity subsequently emerged as the dominant historiographical, political, and 
literary topos describing the peninsula in that period of foreign invasions.144 Machiavelli and 
Vettori both employed Italia as a unifying frame for their analyses of the tumultuous events 
of the early sixteenth century. Writing in the Tuscan dialect both thinkers interpreted and 
articulated the word Italia differently. Their dialect and the concepts it conveyed through 
Florentine usage subsequently diffused throughout the peninsula and emerged as standard 
Italian carrying those meanings with it. The word Italia continued to acquire different 
meanings in different historical contexts, including, after 1861, a nation-state.  
 
144 Natalia Costa-Zalessow, “Italy as Victim: A Historical Appraisal of a Literary Theme,” Italica 45 (1968): 
216-240.  
 
Italia and the Prehistory of the Italian National State 
In the spirit of an epilogue, I would like to suggest some ways that the equivocalness 
and contested nature of Italia in the early sixteenth century might inform some modern 
conversations regarding the same term. While the history of the Italian national state begins 
in 1861, the “prehistory” of Italia extends further back in time. Etienne Balibar defines the 
prehistory of a nation as 
those structures [that] appear retrospectively to us as 
pre-national, because they made possible certain features of the 
nation-state, into which they were ultimately to be incorporated 
with varying degrees of modification. We can therefore 
acknowledge the fact that the national formation is the product 
of a long “prehistory.” This prehistory, however differs in 
essential features from the nationalist myth of linear destiny.145 
To understand the process of the formation of nations, Balibar asserts, one must also 
understand the foundational elements that predate, but not necessarily predetermine, a 
nation’s political constitution. This paper has examined some of the linguistic prehistory of 
the Italian national state. Vettori’s and Machiavelli’s writings of Italia were not previews of 
the Italian nation—such an entity was inconceivable to them—but rather, for those sixteenth-
century Tuscans, Italia was an abstraction whose meaning they helped to construct 
discursively. The historical fate of Italia, from antiquity through the sixteenth century and 
 
145 Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” in Becoming National, ed. Geoff Eley and 
Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 133.  
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down to the present day, suggests not only the essentially historical and amorphous nature of 
the term but also the persistence of an ongoing discussion surrounding its meaning.  
Still today many discussions of Italian national identity explicitly query the meaning 
and valence of Italia. Italian intellectuals, in particular, skeptically question the word’s 
referential substance. In 1964 the Italian journalist Luigi Barzini captured the sense of a 
semantic tension between the unifying implications of the word Italia and the realities of 
diverse regionalism when he reflected that, since the peninsula’s political unification in 1861, 
“official Italy has apparently succeeded merely in unifying names, labels and titles, but not 
reality.”146 Scholars continue to doubt the significance of Italia, some even claiming that the 
word is hollow, not describing a national entity at all, or, in the words of Zeffiro Ciuffoletti, a 
“state without a nation.”147 Even a cursory look at an Italian bookstore shelf yields such titles 
as Se cessiamo di essere una nazione [If We Cease to Be a Nation] and L’Italia non esiste 
[Italy Does Not Exist]. Apparently, then, a telling characteristic of Italy’s nationhood is, at 
least among some intellectuals, its fundamental questioning of its constituent nature.  
Broadly speaking, those Italian scholars point out that there is a decisive gap in 
meaning between Italia and the Italian nation. During the Risorgimento, the nineteenth-
century construct of “nation” imposed itself over the preexisting abstraction of Italia. One of 
the architects of the Risorgimento, Massimo d’Azeglio, famously claimed after 1861, “We 
 
146 Luigi Barzini, The Italians (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 238.  
 
147 Zeffiro Ciuffoletti, “Stato senza nazione,” in La construzione dello stato in Italia e Germania, ed. L. 
Ambrosoli, et al. (Manduria, 1993), 57-68; G.E. Rusconi, Se cessiamo di essere una nazione (Bologna: il 
Mulino, 1993), 1-24, 167-179; Giorgio Calgano, ed, Bianco, rosso, e verde: L’Identità degli Italiani (Rome: 
Laterza, 1993). Also see, Ernesto Galli della Loggia, L’Identià Italiana (Bologna: il Mulino, 1998), 113-165; 
Sergio Salvi, L’Italia non esiste (Florence: Camunia, 1996), 273-277. 
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have made Italy, now we must make Italians.”148 The nineteenth-century national movement 
gave a new meaning, that of a legal entity, to the preexisting concept of Italia. Three 
concepts that had distinct meanings in premodernity—Italia, nazione,149 and stato—had 
merged, at least in the writings of some intellectuals. Because this essay has suggested that 
early modern Italia and modern Italia represent essentially different meanings but also that 
early articulations helped to prefigure later ones, it is perhaps worth noting that some 
scholars of the Renaissance recently devoted attention to the historically amorphous meaning 
of stato. Like Italia, stato represented a contested, dynamic meaning during the Renaissance 
not analogous to modern renderings of “state.”150 A recent conference on the premodern 
origins of the state in Italy engaged the appropriateness of using the centralized state as a 
“category of analysis” in a time when the state as we now know it was “literally 
inconceivable.”151 Participants differed in their opinions but reached some degree of 
 
148 As quoted by Nick Carter in “Nation, Nationality, Nationalism and Internationalism in Italy, from Cavour to 
Mussolini,” The Historical Journal 39 (1992): 545. 
 
149 The word nazione existed in sixteenth-century Italy and before, referring to collaborative commercial 
ventures and the physical space of their foreign, jurisdictionally independent outposts. See Frederico Chabod, 
L’Idea di Nazione (Bari: Laterza, 1979), 19-20. On the early modern etymology of the word, see “Le nazioni in 
Italia,” Salvi, 75-82.  
 
150 See Nicolai Rubinstein’s “Notes on the Word Stato in Florence Before Machiavelli,” in Studies in Italian 
History in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, ed. Giovanni Ciapelli (Rome, 2004), 151-163. On the semantic 
differences between medieval and Renaissance stato see John Najemy’s “Stato, comune, e “universitas,” in 
Orgini dello Stato: Processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo ed età moderna ed. Chittolini, Anthony 
Molho, and Pierangelo Schiera (Bologna: il Mulino, 1994), 647-650. In the same volume, see Giorgio 
Chittolini’s “Il ‘privato,’ il ‘pubblico,’ lo Stato,” 565-572, which explicitly questions the idea that stato has a 
fixed definition which, for Chittolini, includes, “full sovereignty, absolutism, the preeminence of public 
institutions, centralization, coercion, the exercise of power in the name of public interest”). Rather, Chittolini 
adopts Ernesto Sestan’s assertion from Stato e nazione nell’alto Mediovo (Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 
1994), 114, that “the term ‘state’ shares this inconvenience with many other terms in the modern historical 
vocabulary: church, people, country, law, liberty, and so forth. Every concept has its own historical life; the 
term that expresses it remains or can remain intact and unchanged while gradually coming to include shifting 
and diverse conceptual realities.” Where available, I used the English translations from the abbreviated, 
American version, edited by Julius Kirshner, The Origins of the State in Italy, 1300-1600 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996). 
 
151 Kirshner, 5.  
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consensus, deciding that, at the least, the formation of medieval and Renaissance states “was 
a kaleidoscopic event opening up a new imaginative territory.”152 
Similarly, I see Vettori’s and Machiavelli’s discourses on Italia as connected to later 
developments of the word. Vettori’s Sommario, specifically its clear illustration of the 
equivocalness of Italia, suggests that Italy’s dialogical model of national identity has roots in 
the sixteenth century. Vettori’s recasting of Italia as fundamentally weak indicates that the 
modern querying of the word has its origins in the period in which the peninsula was carved 
into independent states. The concept of Italia came under scrutiny in the early sixteenth 
century when the foreign invasions upset the fragile balance of power among the small states 
and revealed that their contrived independence from each other and from  the other European 
states was no longer possible. Although Italia has represented different meanings in various 
historical contexts, it has proved a durable subject of conversation both in the early sixteenth 
century and in more recent times. For many Italians, regional modes of identification may 
still undermine any overarching sense of identity. Like a piazza in the evening, the Italian 
approach to the question of “Italy” as a “nation” is characterized by vibrant discussion and a 
cacophony of voices. Italian national identity contains a self-reflective and intellectually rich 
tradition of querying the meanings of some of its most essential terms. 
Historians, especially Anglo-American ones, have not always recognized the full 
complexity of Italy’s amorphous national identity. By imposing upon it certain expectations 
of inner coherency, they fail to consider Italian identity as equivocal and rooted in an 
ongoing conversation.153 Italian scholar Ernesto Galli della Loggia described Italian national 
 
152 Ibid, 5. 
 
153 Those scholars expect Italy to adhere to some model of unity, implying that Italy’s national identity currently 
lacks an important component achievable only through the breaking down of regional difference. Most recently, 
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identity, especially in regards to its statehood, as “a prisoner of a comparative mechanism” 
that passes negative judgment on Italy’s supposed “absence” of national identity by 
contrasting it with the supposed coherency of the English and French national models.154 
Some historians have recently sought to correct the imposition of false comparisons by 
viewing Italy’s internal diversity and lack of a coherent national identity as an opportunity to 
expand the conceptual limits of the usual nation-based paradigm of historical analyses.155 
Those historians affirm Italy’s status as a nation-state while also suggesting its 
exemplification of an alternate (though certainly not unique) model of nationhood that does 
not conform to any supposed ideal of inner unity but that, instead, accommodates the 
primacy of fragmented, regionally based identities as part of an overarching but fluid national 
identity. 
Recent studies on the origins of nations provide fresh theoretical bases for rethinking 
the nature of Italian national identity and its possible origins in the sixteenth century. In the 
last few years, approaches to the constructions of national identities have emphasized 
 
Gene Brucker wrote, “When, at some distant time in the future, the inhabitants of Lombardy and Sicily feel that 
they are brothers, that they belong to the same community, then the terminus of that long and torturous route (to 
unification) will have been reached,” “From Campanilismo to Nationhood” in Living on the Edge of Leonardo’s 
Florence, 61. See also, Roger Absalom, Italy since 1800: A Nation in the Balance? (New York, 1995); Martin 
Clark, Modern Italy, 1871-1995 (London: Longman, 1996); Duggan, 293-294. I suspect that such 
predetermined measuring of Italy’s sense of nationhood also contributes to the lack of recent studies about 
emerging notions of italianità or the Italian “nation” in the early modern period. An example of a work that 
asserts the early modern roots of what later became “national” identity elsewhere in Europe is Colette Beaune, 
The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France, trans. Susan Ross Huston, ed. 
Fredric L. Cheyette. Berkeley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 
 
154 “Nel campo della statualità e della politica sopratutto l’identità italiana è prigioniera di un meccanismo 
comparativistico. . .dominato dal modello anglo-francese, e in tale comparazione riportare la peggio.” Galli 
della Loggia, 113-116.  
 
155 Nicholas Doumanis, 1-8, calls into question “unfair and inappropriate comparisons with supposedly model 
nations” in regards to Italy’s national identity; Donna R. Gabaccia uses the case of the Italian immigrant 
experience and Italian regional modes of identification “to query the tyranny of the national in the discipline of 
history,” “Is Everywhere Nowhere? Nomads, Nations, and the Immigrant Paradigm of United States History,” 
The Journal of American History 86 (1999):1115-1134.  
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imaginary and creative factors, as well as the role of intellectuals in shaping and modifying 
conceptions of nationhood.156 Perhaps more important, historians such as Balibar, Anthony 
D. Smith, and Prasenjit Duara also question the kind of nationalist ideals and expectations of 
inner coherency—“the myth of linear destiny”—that have misdirected some interpretations 
of Italian national identity.157 For example, Duara’s reassessment of the origins of national 
identity suggests the replacement “of a teleological movement toward a more cohesive ideal” 
with “a mobilization toward particular objects of identification. In this way we may view the 
histories of nations as contingently as nations are themselves contingent.”158 Significantly, 
many of these queries are emerging from scholars with roots outside of the European 
tradition, who are perhaps more willing to consider a broader spectrum of forms of national 
identities. Moving beyond the expectations of a “cohesive ideal” of national identity offers a 
refreshing, validating perspective on Italy’s model, one based on discussion and including an 
on-going questioning of the meaning of Italia.
156 Benedict Anderson defined his now well-known notion of imagined communities as “distinguished by the 
style in which they are imagined” Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991), 6. Strictly speaking, Anderson understood imagined communities as a 
distinctly modern construction, but I have found useful his emphasis on the abstract, that is, extra constitutional, 
elements of “nation.” Also useful is some poststructuralist understandings of national identity that emphasize 
the role of writers and the inherent tension between the very idea of an all-encompassing, coherent national 
identity and its always more complicated reality. See Homi K. Bhabha, “DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the 
margins of the modern nation,” in Nation and Narration (New York: Routledge, 1990), 291-320, and Lloyd S. 
Kramer, “Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 58 (1997): 
534-538.  
 
157 Anthony D. Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” in Becoming National, 106-130, and, in the same volume, 
Prasenjit Duara, “Historicizing National Identity, Or Who Imagines What and When?” 151-179. 
 
158 Duara, 172. 
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